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No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: The Lack of
Protection for Volunteers Under Federal AntiDiscrimination Statutes1
Lawrence D. Rosenthal 2
I. INTRODUCTION
One issue that often arises in cases involving Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) is whether a particular individual is an “employee.” 3 There
are many reasons why this issue is important. First, only employees
can sue under these statutes. 4 Second, an entity might not be
covered by these statutes if it does not have the statutorily required

1. This Article will not focus on the employment status of volunteer student interns.
For articles regarding that topic, see Craig Durrant, Comment, To Benefit or Not To Benefit:
Mutually Induced Consideration as a Test for the Legality of Unpaid Internships, 162 U. PA. L.
REV. 169 (2013); Anthony J. Tucci, Note, Worthy Exemption? Examining How the DOL
Should Apply the FLSA to Unpaid Interns at Nonprofits and Public Agencies, 97 IOWA L. REV.
1363 (2012); David C. Yamada, The Employment Law Rights of Student Interns, 35 CONN. L.
REV. 215 (2002); and Craig J. Ortner, Note, Adapting Title VII to Modern Employment
Realities: The Case for the Unpaid Intern, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2613 (1998).
2. Lawrence D. Rosenthal is the Associate Dean for Academics and a Professor of
Legal Writing at Northern Kentucky University – Salmon P. Chase College of Law. He earned
his J.D. from the Vanderbilt University Law School, and he received his LL.M. from the
Georgetown University Law Center. The author would like to thank Mike Mannheimer for his
thoughtful comments on this Article, and he would also like to thank Bradley Steffen for his
research assistance with this Article.
3. The definitions of “employee” are found in the following sections of the United
States Code: 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2012) (Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (2012) (ADA);
and 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (2012) (ADEA). Throughout this Article, I will spend most of my
time referencing Title VII; however, the statements I make about Title VII also apply to the
ADA and the ADEA unless otherwise noted.
4. See infra cases discussed in Part IV. As will be addressed later, Title VII prohibits
employers from discriminating against “individuals,” not “employees.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1) (2012). Nevertheless, despite an early opinion that did not restrict the term
“individuals” to “employees,” Sibley Mem’l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir.
1973), courts now restrict lawsuits to “employees” (and job applicants and former employees),
Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 1998).
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minimum number of employees. 5 Finally, the number of employees
determines the damage caps under the 1991 Civil Rights Act. 6 As a
result, in an effort to minimize liability under these federal statutes
(and in an effort to save on labor costs), some entities limit the
number of individuals they “employ” and rely on volunteers and/or
independent contractors. 7
This Article will focus on the fact that volunteers cannot sue
under federal anti-discrimination statutes and do not count as
employees when determining whether an entity has the statutorily
required minimum number of employees to be covered under these
statutes. Unfortunately for volunteers, the federal anti-discrimination
statutes’ language and legislative history, 8 the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) interpretation of these statutes, 9
and case law 10 are fairly clear that volunteers cannot sue the entities
to which they devote their time. 11 Although some courts have
allowed certain “volunteers” to bring discrimination claims, they
have not truly conferred the right to sue upon volunteers as a class;
rather, these courts decided only that the plaintiffs were not
volunteers at all but employees and could therefore pursue their

5. For example, both Title VII and the ADA do not apply to entities with fewer
than fifteen “employees.” 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2012).
The ADEA does not apply to entities with fewer than twenty “employees.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 630(b) (2012).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2012) (establishing limits on compensatory and punitive
damages under Title VII and the ADA).
7. The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of who is an employee under various
federal statutes; however, in those cases, the issue did not involve the distinction between
employees and volunteers, but the distinction between employees and independent
contractors. See, e.g., Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449
(2003) (applying a multi-factor, common-law agency test focusing on control when deciding
whether physician-shareholders in a medical practice group were “employees” under the
ADA); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1991) (applying a multifactor, common-law agency test for determining who qualifies as an “employee” under
ERISA); and Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1989)
(applying a common-law agency test focusing on control to determine whether an individual
was an “employee” under the Copyright Act).
8. See infra Section III.A.
9. See EEOC Compl. Man. § 2-III(A)(1)(c) (U.S. 2000).
10. See infra Part IV.
11. These volunteers might, however, be able to bring tort or contract claims against
their “employers” if the facts of those cases give rise to either of those types of causes of action.
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claims. 12 Thus, for volunteers to gain the protections of federal antidiscrimination statutes, they must prove that they are actually
employees inaccurately labeled as “volunteers.” 13
Interestingly, a split of authority has developed regarding how
someone qualifies as an employee. Some courts first analyze the
benefits an individual receives and require a showing that those
benefits constitute sufficient remuneration. 14 If there is sufficient
remuneration, courts then use a common-law agency test to
evaluate the relationship. 15 Other courts do not look at
remuneration as a threshold inquiry, but rather consider it as one
factor in evaluating the relationship. 16 Regardless of which test is
used, if the court determines the plaintiff is a volunteer, he will
have no remedy under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA. Despite
the time these individuals devote to various types of entities, and
despite the risks some of these individuals take (especially volunteer
firemen), courts have routinely rejected their requests for
protection from discrimination. 17
This Article will first address the statutory provisions that have led
courts to leave volunteers unprotected. 18 Next, the Article will explore
the statutes’ legislative history and the EEOC’s position regarding this
issue. 19 The Article will then address the circuit split regarding how

12. See infra Part IV. In some situations, the issue was not whether the plaintiff was an
employee who could sue; rather, the court had to determine whether other individuals in the
“workplace” were employees who would count toward the statutorily-required minimum
number of employees for an entity to be subject to federal anti-discrimination statutes. See
infra Part IV.
13. Because entities must have a minimum number of employees to be covered under
federal anti-discrimination statutes, plaintiffs must also occasionally prove that their “coworkers” are “employees.” See supra notes 5, 12.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part IV. Although this test evaluates many factors, it focuses mostly on the
amount of control the “employer” exerts over the “employee.” See Clackamas
Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449 (2003) (applying a multi-factor,
common-law agency test focusing on control when deciding whether physician-shareholders in
a medical practice group were “employees” under the ADA).
16. See infra Section IV.B.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part III. As will be addressed later, the EEOC’s position regarding the
issue of how to determine an individual’s employment status is not entirely clear. I do,
however, try to clarify this issue later in the Article. See infra notes 36, 66.
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courts determine employment status. 20 Finally, the Article will provide
reasons how and why Congress, the courts, and the EEOC should
expand protection to volunteers. 21 If these statutes’ protections are
expanded, more people will likely continue to volunteer their time and
there will be more pleasant work environments; Congress, the courts,
and the EEOC will send a message that no discrimination will be
tolerated, regardless of the victim; and victims of discrimination will
have a remedy, even if they are not true employees. In order to further
these worthy goals, Congress, the courts, and the EEOC should do
what they can to ensure that federal anti-discrimination statutes
protect volunteers.
II. THE RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are several provisions of Title VII relevant to the issue of
who may sue and whom those individuals can sue; these provisions
are: (1) the substantive prohibition against discrimination, 22 (2) the
definition of “employer,” 23 and (3) the definition of “employee.” 24
First, Title VII’s substantive prohibition against discrimination
provides the following, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer –
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. 25

20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part V. The language Congress used to explain the EEOC’s power to
issue regulations is different under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA. See Melissa Hart,
Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1937, 1941
(2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2012) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2012) (ADEA);
42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2012) (ADA)).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
23. § 2000e(b).
24. § 2000e(f). The ADA and the ADEA have similar provisions regarding the
prohibition against discrimination, and they also have similar definitions of “employee” and
“employer.” See infra note 25.
25. § 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added). This provision from Title VII focuses on
intentional discrimination (disparate treatment). Subsection (2) (not provided) addresses
employer policies that tend to limit or segregate employment opportunities based on protected
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The substance of Title VII’s other relevant provisions is the
following: (1) “[t]he term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for
each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a
person . . . [,]” 26 and (2) “[t]he term ‘employee’ means an individual
employed by an employer . . . .” 27 Although Title VII’s substantive
prohibition against discrimination addresses discrimination against
“individuals,” 28 courts have held that “individuals” means only
employees (and job applicants, and former employees), and that it
does not cover volunteers. 29 One reason for this interpretation is that
the statute prohibits “employers” from engaging in discriminatory
actions, suggesting that only employees are protected. 30 Also, the
statute refers to “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

characteristics (disparate impact). § 2000e-2(a)(2). In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress
added a separate statutory provision to address claims of disparate impact. See § 2000e-2(k).
The ADA’s relevant prohibitions and definitions can be found at § 12112 (providing a
substantive prohibition against discrimination), § 12111(5) (defining “employer”), and §
12111(4) (defining “employee”).
The ADEA’s relevant prohibitions and definitions can be found at 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012)
(providing a substantive prohibition against discrimination), § 630(b) (defining “employer”),
and § 630(f) (defining “employee”). All three statutes (Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA)
have very similar definitions of the terms “employer” and “employee.”
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
27. § 2000e(f). As will be referenced several times in this Article, many courts have
commented that Title VII’s definition of “employee” is vague and of little value. See infra Part IV.
28. § 2000e-2(a). See, e.g., Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236,
1242–43 (11th Cir. 1998), where the court noted that Title VII prohibits discrimination
against “individuals,” but that just about all courts have limited Title VII protections to
employees, former employees, and job applicants. The court relied on the following cases
for this proposition: McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir. 1972);
Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir. 1997); Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med.
Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 1996); and Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794
F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 1986), abrogated by Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., v. Wells,
538 U.S. 440 (2003).
29. See supra note 28.
30. § 2000e-2(a). See also Llampallas, 163 F.3d at 1243 (observing that Congress
intended to limit Title VII to employment relationships); Tadros v. Coleman, 717 F. Supp.
996, 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff’d, 898 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Title VII is an employment
law, available only to employees . . . seeking redress for the unlawful employment practices of
their employers.”). But see Sibley Mem’l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (deciding that Title VII reaches beyond “employees” and allows other “individuals” to
pursue discrimination claims).
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employment,” 31 supporting the position that Title VII protects only
employees (and job applicants and former employees). 32
The ADEA and the ADA have similar provisions, and these
statutes have also been interpreted as not applying to volunteers. 33 As
a result, a plaintiff must satisfy the definition of “employee” and
must also prove that the defendant has the requisite number of
employees to be an “employer.” Although the first place courts look
when determining an individual’s employment status is the justdiscussed statutory language which restricts claims to employees,
some courts also look to legislative history and the EEOC’s
interpretation of these statutes for guidance.
III. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION’S POSITION
Two places courts sometimes look when interpreting these
statutes are the statutes’ legislative history and the EEOC’s position
on this issue. 34 The most relevant parts of the statutes’ legislative
history involve (1) how Congress wanted the term “employee”
interpreted, and (2) the purpose behind these statutes. The EEOC
has addressed the volunteer issue in its Compliance Manual in two
ways. 35 First, the agency has stated that the determination of
employment status should be made by looking at a variety of factors,

31. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added).
32. Based on the language Congress used, courts could apply a very expansive
interpretation and determine that all individuals (including volunteers) can pursue these claims;
however, even if a volunteer can sue, that person must demonstrate that the defendant employs at
least fifteen employees, and is therefore an “employer” subject to Title VII. See § 2000e(b)
(defining employer); § 2000e-2(a) (providing examples of unlawful employer practices).
33. See supra note 25 for citations to the relevant definitions and substantive
prohibitions from the ADEA and the ADA. See also Fichman v. Media Ctr., 512 F.3d 1157,
1158–60 (9th Cir. 2008), where the plaintiff brought claims pursuant to both the ADEA and
the ADA, and the court engaged in a similar analysis for both claims.
34. Although there is not much legislative history regarding whether federal antidiscrimination statutes protect volunteers, the legislative history does address how courts
should interpret the terms “employee” and “employer.” See, e.g., Graves v. Women’s Prof’l
Rodeo Ass’n, Inc., 907 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that Congress wanted the regular
“dictionary definition[s]” to be used when interpreting these terms); see also infra this Part.
35. See EEOC Compl. Man. § 2-III(A)(1) (U.S. 2000). As noted earlier, Congress
used different language when granting rule-making authority to the EEOC under Title VII,
the ADA, and the ADEA. See supra note 21.
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with no one factor being dispositive. 36 Second, the agency has made
clear that it believes that volunteers cannot sue under federal antidiscrimination statutes; however, it has created some exceptions to
this general rule. 37 The EEOC’s positions on this issue will be
addressed after the discussion of the statutes’ legislative history.
A. The Legislative History
Although the statutes’ legislative history does not directly address
volunteers and whether they can sue, some courts have relied on the
statutes’ legislative history when deciding this issue or determining
whether the defendant is subject to the statutes’ prohibitions. 38 Most
courts that look at legislative history rely on the history that instructs
courts to look at the dictionary definition of “employee” when

36. See § 2-III(A)(1). Specifically, the Manual provides the following: “The question of
whether an employer-employee relationship exists is fact-specific and depends on whether the
employer controls the means and manner of the worker’s work performance. This
determination requires consideration of all aspects of the worker’s relationship with the
employer.” Id. These factors include: (1) “[t]he employer has the right to control when, where,
and how the worker performs the job”; (2) “[t]he work does not require a high level of skill or
expertise”; (3) “[t]he employer furnishes the tools, materials, and equipment”; (4) “[t]he work is
performed on the employer’s premises”; (5) “[t]here is a continuing relationship between the
worker and the employer” (6) “[t]he employer has the right to assign additional projects to the
worker”; (6) “[t]he employer sets the hours of work and the duration of the job”; (7) “[t]he
worker is paid by the hour, week, or month rather than the agreed cost of performing a particular
job”; (8) “[t]he worker does not hire and pay assistants”; (9) “[t]he work performed by the
worker is part of the regular business of the employer”; (10) “[t]he employer is in business”; (11)
“[t]he worker is not engaged in his/her own distinct occupation or business”; (12) “[t]he
employer provides the worker with benefits such as insurance, leave, or workers’ compensation”;
(13) “[t]he worker is considered an employee of the employer for tax purposes (i.e., the employer
withholds federal, state, and Social Security taxes)”; (14) “[t]he employer can discharge the
worker”; and (15) “[t]he worker and the employer believe that they are creating an employeremployee relationship.” Id.
37. See § 2-III(A)(1)(c). These exceptions will be addressed in Section III.B of the
Article. As will be discussed, the EEOC’s positions could appear to be inconsistent. On one
hand, the EEOC indicates that the determination of employment status evaluates several
factors, with no one factor being dispositive. On the other hand, the EEOC seems to
acknowledge the validity of the threshold remuneration test when it takes the position that
some “volunteers” can be considered employees if they receive sufficient compensation for
their services. The inconsistency might, however, be explained away by interpreting the
EEOC’s position as being that if an individual can satisfy the threshold remuneration test, he
can then proceed to the next step of trying to satisfy the EEOC’s multi-factor test.
38. See, e.g., Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1243 (11th Cir.
1998); Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc., 6 F.3d 211, 220 (4th Cir. 1993);
Graves, 907 F.2d at 73.
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deciding employment status; 39 however, some courts dig a bit deeper
to try to find the specific meaning of the relevant terms. 40
One court that addressed this issue is the Eleventh Circuit. 41 One
of the issues involved in Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., was
whether non-employees could sue under Title VII. 42 The court (1)
looked at Congressional intent and Title VII’s legislative history, 43
(2) noted that, in enacting Title VII, Congress did not “presume to
obliterate all manner of inequality,” 44 and (3) stated what it believed
was the answer to this question. 45
The court then looked at Title VII’s 1972 Amendments, which
extended Title VII’s coverage to federal employment. 46 The court
noted that the amendments covered “all personnel actions affecting
employees or applicants for employment . . . [,]” and that the
amendments would make sense only if the original statute applied
only to employees. 47 The court concluded that “the amendment[s]
support[] the interpretation of ‘any individual’ . . . as limited to
those individuals who are employees.” 48
Another court to address Title VII’s legislative history was the
Eighth Circuit. 49 In Graves v. Women’s Professional Rodeo Ass’n, the
court used the ordinary, dictionary definitions of “employee,”
“employer,” and “employ.” 50 It did so because of Title VII’s

39. See supra note 34.
40. See Llampallas, 163 F.3d at 1243.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1241–45.
43. Id. at 1243.
44. Id. (quoting Keyes v. Sec’y of the Navy, 853 F.2d 1016, 1026 (1st Cir. 1988)).
45. Id. (“Congress intended to limit the scope of the Act to specific employment
relationships; thus, the statute provides relief only against ‘employers’ as defined under the
statute. We can assume that Congress also meant to limit the pool of potential plaintiffs under
Title VII; otherwise, any person could sue an ‘employer’ under the statute regardless of
whether she actually had an employment relationship with that employer. Hence, courts have
almost universally held that the scope of the term ‘any individual’ is limited to employees.”
(emphasis added)).
46. Id.
47. Id. (quoting Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §
717, 86 Stat. 103, 111 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1994))).
48. Id. Although the court in Llampallas certainly addressed the meaning of the term
“employee,” it focused more of its attention on the definition of “individual.” Id. at 1242–43.
49. Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo Ass’n, 907 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1990).
50. Id. at 72–73.
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legislative history, which “explicitly provides that the dictionary
definition should govern the interpretation of ‘employer’ under Title
VII.” 51 After citing from Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary, the court concluded:
Central to the meaning of these words is the idea of
compensation in exchange for services: an employer is someone
who pays, directly or indirectly, wages or a salary or other
compensation to the person who provides services—that person
being the employee. Compensation by the putative employer to
the putative employee in exchange for his services is not a
sufficient condition, but it is an essential condition to the
existence of an employer-employee relationship. 52

As will be addressed later, Graves adopted the position the
majority of courts use when distinguishing between employees and
volunteers, requiring a threshold showing of sufficient remuneration
before more details of the relationship can be evaluated. 53
Another statement regarding Title VII’s legislative history comes
from two district courts—the Eastern District of Pennsylvania54 and
the Middle District of North Carolina. 55 Specifically, the court in
Smith v. Berks Cmty. Television relied on McBroom v. Western Electric
Co. for the following proposition: “‘In enacting Title VII, Congress
sought to eliminate a pervasive, objectionable history of denying or
limiting one’s livelihood simply because of one’s race, color, sex,
religion or national origin.’ . . . Unpaid volunteers are not susceptible
to the discriminatory practices which the Act was designed to

51. Id. at 73 (citing 110 CONG. REC. 7216 (1964) (subcommittee response to Sen.
Dirksen’s memorandum)).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 73–74. As will be addressed later, the Fourth Circuit cited to the Eighth
Circuit’s use of Title VII’s legislative history. See Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 6
F.3d 211, 220 (4th Cir. 1993). The Fourth Circuit also cited Smith v. Berks Cmty. Television,
657 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1987), for the following two propositions: (1) “[i]n enacting Title
VII, Congress sought to eliminate a pervasive, objectionable history of denying or limiting
one’s livelihood simply because of one’s race, color, sex, religion or national origin”; and (2)
“[u]npaid volunteers are not susceptible to the discriminatory practices which the Act was
designed to eliminate.” Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 221 (quoting Smith, 657 F. Supp. at 795).
54. Smith, 657 F. Supp. at 794.
55. McBroom, 429 F. Supp. at 909.
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eliminate.” 56 This statement reflects currently prevailing judicial
views toward the interpretation of Title VII and other federal antidiscrimination statutes with respect to protecting volunteers. 57
Thus, there is support for the position that Title VII applies only
to employees (and job applicants and former employees). 58 First,
congressional intent suggests that the term “employee” should be
given its ordinary dictionary definition, and that dictionary definition
would not include volunteers. 59 Second, the 1972 amendments
arguably support the proposition that volunteers are not covered.60
And finally case law interpreting the history behind antidiscrimination statutes suggests that Title VII was intended to
protect against discrimination in employment opportunities, and that
volunteers do not fall within the class Congress intended to protect
when it passed Title VII and other federal anti-discrimination
statutes. 61 As a result, volunteers must look elsewhere for protection
against discrimination in the “workplace.”
B. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Position
Although the EEOC has not published a regulation regarding
this issue, it has addressed the issue in its Compliance Manual. 62 The

56. Smith, 657 F. Supp. at 795 (quoting McBroom, 429 F. Supp. at 911)
(emphasis added).
57. See also Tawes v. Frankford Volunteer Fire Co., No. 03-842-KAJ, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 786, at *10 (D. Del. Jan. 13, 2005) (“[T]he purpose of Title VII ‘is plain from the
language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group.’” (quoting Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (emphasis added)).
58. As noted earlier, courts have interpreted the ADA and the ADEA in a similar
manner. See supra notes 24, 25.
59. See 110 CONG. REC. 7216 (1964) (response of the subcommittee to Sen. Dirksen’s
memorandum). Also, as was addressed in Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d
1236, 1243 (11th Cir. 1998), the term “individual” is limited to employees, job applicants,
and former employees.
60. See Llampallas, 163 F.3d at 1242–44 (addressing Title VII and the 1972
amendments to the statute).
61. See Smith, 657 F. Supp. at 795 (quoting McBroom, 429 F. Supp. at 911). See also
Tadros v. Coleman, 717 F. Supp. 996, 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff’d, 898 F.2d 10 (2d Cir.
1990) (“Title VII is an employment law, available only to employees . . . seeking redress for the
unlawful employment practices of their employers.”)
62. See EEOC Compl. Man. § 2-III(A)(1)(c) (U.S. 2000). One possible reason the
EEOC has not issued a regulation regarding this issue is that its power to do so is unclear, as
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Manual is clear that volunteers cannot sue under federal antidiscrimination statutes. 63 The Manual does, however, provide
two exceptions:
Volunteers usually are not protected “employees.” However, an
individual may be considered an employee of a particular entity if,
as a result of volunteer service, s/he receives benefits such as a
pension, group life insurance, workers’ compensation, and access to
professional certification, even if the benefits are provided by a
third party. The benefits constitute “significant remuneration”
rather than merely the “inconsequential incidents of an otherwise
gratuitous relationship.” 64
...
A volunteer may also be covered by the EEO statutes if the
volunteer work is required for regular employment or regularly
leads to regular employment with the same entity. In such
situations, discrimination by the respondent operates to deny the
charging party an employment opportunity. 65

Therefore, although the EEOC believes that volunteers are not
protected, volunteers might be able to gain protection if they receive
sufficient benefits or if their volunteer positions can lead to “regular
employment” with the same entity. 66 Thus, while the EEOC believes
that volunteers are not protected in most cases, it does provide for
some situations in which they could pursue their claims. 67
Congress used different language when giving the agency the authority to promulgate
regulations under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA. See supra note 21.
63. EEOC Compl. Man. § 2-III(A)(1)(c) (U.S. 2000).
64. Id. The EEOC Compliance Manual cited Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs of the
Farmingville Fire Dist., 180 F.3d 468 (2d Cir. 1999), and Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of
Rising Sun, 6 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 1993) for these propositions.
65. Id. The case upon which the EEOC relied for this proposition was Charlton v.
Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 198 n.4 (3d Cir. 1994).
66. See infra Part IV.
67. Of course, if the “volunteer” received these significant benefits, that person would
most likely no longer be considered a “volunteer”; rather, he or she would be considered an
employee. In Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad, No. 11 C 04920, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
171623, at *22 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2012), the Northern District of Illinois cited the Manual
when determining whether an individual was an employee. The EEOC suggests using a list of
factors when deciding who qualifies as an employee, but it also provides in its Compliance
Manual that individuals can be considered employees if they receive sufficient benefits. See
supra notes 36, 37. See also infra Part IV. As noted previously, these two positions taken by the
EEOC could appear to be inconsistent. On one hand, the EEOC indicates that the
determination of employment status evaluates several factors, with no one factor being
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Although the EEOC usually takes pro-plaintiff positions, it does
not take a pro-plaintiff approach on the issue of whether volunteers
can pursue claims under federal anti-discrimination statutes. 68
Nonetheless, by providing some exceptions to this general rule, the
EEOC is giving hope to some individuals who dedicate time and
effort to benefit a particular organization. 69 Although not many courts
have relied specifically on the EEOC’s Compliance Manual when
addressing this issue, the Fifth Circuit cited to the Manual in support
of its position that while volunteers are generally not protected, in
some circumstances certain “volunteers” can pursue their claims. 70
That opinion, along with other opinions that relied on the EEOC’s
position, will be addressed in the next Part of this Article. 71
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING HOW TO DETERMINE
EMPLOYMENT STATUS
Although courts agree that volunteers are not covered under
federal anti-discrimination statutes, the courts are split regarding

dispositive. On the other hand, the EEOC seems to acknowledge the validity of the threshold
remuneration test when it provides the first exception listed above. The inconsistency might,
however, be explained by interpreting the EEOC’s position as being that if an individual can
fall in to the exception regarding remuneration, he or she can then proceed to the next step of
trying to satisfy the EEOC’s multi-factor test.
68. As will be addressed later, one interpretation of the EEOC Compliance Manual is
that it does take a more pro-plaintiff approach by endorsing the totality-of-the-circumstances
test rather than the threshold remuneration test. But see supra notes 37, 67.
69. Specifically, according to the EEOC, an individual can lose his “volunteer” status
and become an employee if he receives sufficient benefits and/or if his volunteer activities can
create a pathway to full-time employment. See § 2-III(A)(1)(c).
70. See Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 439 (5th Cir. 2013).
In addition to the Fifth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit also looked at the EEOC’s position on this
issue. See Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 656 F.3d 348, 353 (6th Cir. 2011),
where the court noted the EEOC’s position that volunteers are typically not employees, but
can be considered employees if they receive sufficient benefits. In Bryson, the EEOC had
determined that the individuals in question were employees because their employer
“exercise[d] sufficient control over the actions of the [m]embers” and because the members
received compensation despite not being on the defendant’s payroll. Id. In a different case, the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts also relied on the EEOC
Compliance Manual when it evaluated the status of several individuals the plaintiff claimed
were “employees” under the ADA. See Mahoney v. Morgan, No. 08-10879-MBB, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 97224, at *23–24 (D. Mass. Sept. 16, 2010).
71. See supra note 36 for the list of factors the EEOC considers when determining
employment status.
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how to determine whether someone is a volunteer or an employee. 72
Most courts first evaluate whether the individual receives sufficient
remuneration prior to possibly being considered an employee. 73 If the
individual receives sufficient remuneration, the courts then use
common-law agency principles to determine the nature of the
relationship; this multi-factor, common-law agency test focuses on
the control the “employer” can exercise over the “employee.”74
Some circuits, however, take a different approach and look at
remuneration as only one factor used to determine employment
status. 75 Irrespective of which test the courts use, the analysis of
employment status does not address whether volunteers can sue; it
answers only whether the individuals are, in fact, volunteers. By
answering only that question, the courts fail to address the more
important issue of whether volunteers should be protected from
discrimination in the workplace.

72. See supra Part I.
73. The Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits follow the majority
approach and require a finding of sufficient remuneration before evaluating the other aspects of
the relationship. See infra this Part. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has not yet directly addressed this issue, but that court did apply a similar twopart inquiry in determining whether auxiliary choristers were employees under the National
Labor Relations Act. See Seattle Opera v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 757, 761–63 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
74. Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 656 F.3d 348, 356–59 (6th Cir.
2011) (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In addition to looking at the
“control” issue, some courts look at the “economic realities” of the situation to see if the
“employee” is truly dependent on the “employer.” See Dorr v. Ford Motor Co., No. 10-CV13822, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133827, at *12–13 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 27, 2011), adopted by,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133776 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 21, 2011).
75. The Sixth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit follow this approach. See infra Section
IV.B. Also, at least one district court from within the First Circuit has relatively recently
utilized the totality-of-the-circumstances test when deciding the employment status of several
individuals. See Mahoney, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97224 at *17–20 (relying on Lopez v.
Massachusetts, 588 F.3d 69, 84–85 (1st Cir. 2009)). In that opinion, the court noted that lack
of remuneration was not dispositive. See Mahoney, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97224, at *23–24.
A district court from within the Seventh Circuit also followed this approach, creating a split
within the Seventh Circuit. See Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad, No. 11 C 04920, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 171623 at *22–28 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2012).

129

03.ROSENTHAL.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/1/2016 8:57 PM

2016

A. The Majority Approach
In determining employment status, most courts require a twopart inquiry. The first part evaluates the individual’s remuneration.76
If there is no remuneration, or if the remuneration is negligible, that
individual will not be considered an employee. 77 If, however, there is
more than de minimis remuneration, the court will then look at
common-law agency principles and evaluate factors related to those
principles to determine the nature of the relationship. 78 This
approach is followed by the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits. 79
The Second Circuit addressed this issue in Pietras v. Bd. of Fire
Comm’rs of the Farmingville Fire Dist., where the plaintiff, a
volunteer probationary firefighter, alleged a Title VII violation.80
76. See, e.g., Bryson, 656 F.2d at 356 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Although I am using the term “plaintiff” here, this analysis also applies in situations
where it is clear that the plaintiff is an employee, but the court has to determine whether the
defendant meets the fifteen-employee threshold to be an “employer” under Title VII. Some of
the cases described in this Section address whether the plaintiff was an employee; some address
whether the other people “working” for the defendant were employees; and some cases
address both issues. Nonetheless, courts use the same analysis regardless of whether they are
trying to determine the employment status of a plaintiff or the employment status of
individuals who might or might not count toward the threshold needed for coverage under
federal anti-discrimination statutes.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See cases cited infra this Section. The First, Third, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have
not squarely addressed this issue; however, as will be discussed in this Section, district courts
from within these jurisdictions have issued opinions regarding this issue. See infra this Section.
80. 180 F.3d 468, 470 (2d Cir. 1999). In addition to Pietras, the following cases from
the Second Circuit and from district courts within the Second Circuit also support the
proposition that the first question to evaluate when determining employment status is whether
the individual receives adequate remuneration for the work he performs. Gulino v. N.Y. State
Educ. Dep’t, 460 F.3d 361, 372 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that courts should look to the
“common-law principles” only in situations that “plausibly approximate an employment
relationship,” and that there must be some direct or indirect remuneration from the employer.
If no remuneration exists, there is no employment relationship); Knight v. State Univ. of N.Y.
at Stony Brook, No. 13-CV-0481(JS)(GRB), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161185, at *7–8
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2013) (noting that when determining the nature of the relationship, the
first question to ask is whether the plaintiff has received any type of remuneration from the
defendant); Pastor v. P’ship for Children’s Rights, No. 10-CV-5167(CBA)(LB), 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 140917, at *3–7 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 27, 2012), aff’d, 538 F. App’x 119 (2d Cir.
2013) (“Volunteers and interns constitute employees under Title VII and the ADA only if they
receive some kind of direct or indirect financial benefit or promise thereof from an
employer.”); Carcasole-Lacal v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 02-CV-4359(DGT), 2003 U.S. Dist.
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One issue the court addressed was whether the plaintiff was an
employee. 81 Recognizing that Title VII’s definitions of “employee”
and “employer” were not helpful, the court stated that when
Congress used the word “employee,” it intended “the conventional
master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency
doctrine.” 82 The court then observed that this question “usually
turns on whether [the individual] has received ‘direct or indirect
remuneration’ from the alleged employer.” 83 Rejecting the argument
that an employee must receive a salary, the court noted that receipt
of other types of benefits could result in an employment
relationship. 84 The court stated: “[I]t is clear that an employment
relationship within the scope of Title VII can exist even when the
putative employee receives no salary so long as he or she gets
numerous job-related benefits.” 85 Here, the plaintiff received a
retirement pension, life and disability insurance, death benefits, and
some medical benefits. 86 The court concluded that because of these
benefits, the district court was not clearly erroneous in deciding that
the plaintiff was an employee. 87 Thus, although the defendant
thought it used volunteers, the court concluded that some of those
individuals could be considered employees; 88 the court did not,

LEXIS 11507, at *19–20 (E.D.N.Y. July 8, 2003), aff’d, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13619 (2d
Cir. July 7, 2005) (noting that under the ADEA, an employee must be the recipient of “some
type of job-related benefits” and meet the common-law agency test); Tyszka v. Edward
McMahon Agency, 188 F. Supp. 2d 186, 193 (D. Conn. 2001) (noting that a plaintiff must
receive direct or indirect benefits to be considered an employee); Keller v. Niskayuna Consol.
Fire Dist. 1, 51 F. Supp. 2d 223, 231–32 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that there is no
employment relationship without any “hire[],” which would entail guaranteed benefits in
exchange for services provided).
81. Pietras, 180 F.3d at 472–73.
82. Id. at 473 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318,
322–23 (1992)).
83. Id. (quoting O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1997)).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 471
87. Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs of Farmingville Fire Dist., 180 F.3d 468, 473
(2d Cir. 1999).
88. Id. Following the majority rule, the court should have next applied common-law
agency principles to analyze the relationship. See United States v. City of New York, 359 F.3d
83, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that to prove “employee” status, one must show that he was
hired by the putative employer and then prevail under the multi-factor, common-law agency
test). See also EEOC v. Inc. Vill. of Valley Stream, 535 F. Supp. 2d 323, 328–29 (E.D.N.Y.
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however, tackle the issue of whether “true” volunteers could sue
under Title VII. 89
A few years after Pietras, the Second Circuit again addressed this
issue. 90 In York v. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, the plaintiff
was involved with the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, which provided her with clerical assistance, a workspace,
publicity, and reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses. 91 The
plaintiff also used her position to network and to take tax
deductions. 92 The plaintiff sued the defendant after she stopped
“working,” allegedly because she rebuffed sexual advances and was
retaliated against for doing so. 93 Relying on O’Connor v. Davis and
Pietras, the court decided that the plaintiff was not an employee. 94

2008), where the court followed Pietras and concluded that there was a question of fact
regarding whether volunteer firefighters were employees under the ADEA. The court based its
conclusion on the fact that volunteer firefighters were entitled to receive several
“significant benefits.” Id.
89. Even prior to Pietras, the Second Circuit had determined that remuneration was a
“preliminary question” which can be dispositive of the issue of whether an individual is an
employee under Title VII. See O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115–16 (2d Cir. 1997)
(“[O]nly where a ‘hire’ has occurred should the common-law agency analysis be
undertaken.”). See also City of New York, 359 F.3d at 91–92, where the court observed that to
prove “employee” status, one must first show that he was hired by the putative employer (by
showing remuneration for work performed); Pastor v. P’ship for Children’s Rights, No. 10CV-5167(CBA)(LB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140917, at *6 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 27, 2012),
aff’d, 538 F. App’x 119 (2d Cir. 2013), (noting that volunteer attorneys were not
“employees” despite receiving reimbursement for CLE courses and training relevant to their
work). In Pastor, the court determined that these benefits were not sufficiently substantial, but
were rather “merely incidental” to the work the volunteers performed. Id. at *6–7.
90. York v. Ass’n of the Bar of N.Y.C., 286 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2002).
91. Id. at 124.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 125–26 (“We have refined the rather elliptical statutory definition to hold
that ‘a prerequisite to considering whether an individual is [an employee] is that the individual
have been hired in the first instance.’ Furthermore, we have stated ‘that the question of
whether someone is or is not an employee under Title VII usually turns on whether he or she
has received direct or indirect remuneration from the alleged employer.’. . . Where no financial
benefit is obtained by the purported employee from the employer, no ‘plausible’ employment
relationship of any sort can be said to exist because although ‘compensation by the putative
employer to the putative employee in exchange for his services is not a sufficient condition, . . .
it is an essential condition to the existence of an employer-employee relationship.’”) (quoting
O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 115–16; Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs of the Farmingville Fire Dist.,
180 F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1999); Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo Ass’n, Inc., 907 F.2d
71, 73 (8th Cir. 1990)).
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The court then noted the type of benefits that could turn a
volunteer relationship into an employment relationship; these
benefits included salary, wages, vacation, sick pay, or health
insurance. 95 The court indicated that these benefits “must meet a
minimum level of ‘significance,’ or substantiality, in order to find an
employment relationship in the absence of more traditional
compensation.” 96 The court concluded that the benefits the plaintiff
received “were merely incidental to the administration of the
Association’s programs for the benefit of the bar at large.” 97 The
court also noted that “a party claiming to be an employee under
Title VII must come forward with substantial benefits not merely
incidental to the activity performed in order to satisfy this Circuit’s
remuneration test.” 98 The court then concluded that the plaintiff
could not meet that standard. 99 As demonstrated by the holdings in
Pietras and York, the Second Circuit follows the majority approach
of requiring a preliminary inquiry into remuneration before looking
at other aspects of the “employment” relationship.
Although the Third Circuit has not addressed this issue, district
courts within the Third Circuit have done so. 100 In Tawes v.
Frankford Volunteer Fire Co., the plaintiff was a volunteer firefighter
who sued under the ADA; one issue the court addressed was
whether the volunteer firefighters were employees. 101 This was
relevant because, excluding the firefighters, the department never
had more than three employees, making the ADA inapplicable.102
After noting the ADA’s definition of “employee” was not helpful,
the court looked to Title VII precedent by the Supreme Court. 103

95. York, 286 F.3d at 126 (quoting Pietras, 180 F.3d at 473).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Tawes v. Frankford Volunteer Fire Co., No. 03-842-KAJ, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 786 (D. Del. Jan. 13, 2005).
101. Id. at *1, 8–9.
102. Id. at *8.
103. Id. at *9–11. (“The Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of Title VII ‘is
plain from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities
and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group.’ ‘In enacting
Title VII, Congress sought to eliminate a pervasive, objectionable history of denying or
limiting one’s livelihood simply because of one’s race, color, sex, religion or national origin.’
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The court cited to the Supreme Court for the proposition that
in “the application of social legislation[,] employees are those who
as a matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business to
which they render service.” 104 The court continued, “[a]s such,
when determining if an individual’s livelihood is denied or limited
in an employment discrimination case, ‘one must examine the
economic realities underlying the relationship between the
individual and the so-called principal.’” 105 Although the court
appeared to be applying the “economic realities” test, the court
specifically noted that “[c]ompensation is of course of paramount
importance to such an inquiry.” 106
After recognizing how other courts have addressed the status of
volunteers, the court analyzed the at-issue benefits. 107 These benefits
included “line-of-duty benefits” (secondary automobile insurance,
death and disability benefits, funeral expenses, eligibility for workers’
compensation, a tax credit for the purchase of items necessary for the
position, training, and uniforms and equipment used to perform the
plaintiff’s role as a firefighter), discounts on wireless phones (and
phone service), and use of the department’s facilities. 108 The court
concluded that the “line-of-duty benefits” were insufficient to
establish an employment relationship, as they “ha[d] no benefit
outside of one’s role as a firefighter.” 109 The court also concluded
The same motivation can be seen in the text of the ADA, which states that the statute is
applicable in ‘regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.’” (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)).
104. Id. at *11 (quoting United States v. W.M. Webb, Inc., 397 U.S. 179, 185 (1970)).
105. Tawes, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 786, at *11 (quoting Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d
1332, 1340 (6th Cir. 1983), abrogated by Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006)).
106. Id. (citing O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1997)). The “economic
realities” test focuses on whether the individual at issue is dependent upon the business or entity
for which he “volunteers” his time. See W.M. Webb, Inc., 397 U.S. at 185. If courts adopt this test
when deciding employment status of “volunteers,” most volunteers would not be considered
employees because they are not relying on their volunteer positions as a means of support.
107. Tawes, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 786, at *14–17. Specifically, the court looked at
Graves v. Women’s Prof’l. Rodeo Ass’n, Inc., 907 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1990); Hall v. Delaware
Council on Crime & Justice, 780 F. Supp. 241, 244 (D. Del. 1992), aff’d, 975 F.2d 1549 (3d
Cir. 1992); Smith v. Berks Cmty. Television, 657 F. Supp. 794, 795–96 (E.D. Pa. 1987), and
Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 6 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 1993). Graves, Smith, and
Haavistola will be discussed in greater detail later in this Part of the Article.
108. Tawes, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 786, at *3–4.
109. Id. at *14.
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that wireless phone and phone service discounts were insufficient. 110
The issue with which the court had the most trouble was the pension
benefit. 111 After analyzing that benefit, the court concluded that such
a de minimis benefit could not create an employment relationship. 112
Finally, the court looked at how the parties viewed the
relationship. 113 According to the court, the parties viewed the
relationship as being of a volunteer nature. 114 The remuneration was
no more than de minimis, and the plaintiff’s work did not “allow[]
him . . . to qualify to work in new and desirable fields.” 115 Also, the
plaintiff admitted that firefighting brought him “pride and intangible
benefits.” 116 While acknowledging the volunteers’ sacrifices, the
court noted that the volunteers did not make those sacrifices as
employees 117 and concluded that the department was not an
employer under the ADA. 118 Therefore, at least one district court
within the Third Circuit focused on remuneration as a preliminary
inquiry when evaluating the at-issue relationship. 119
The Fourth Circuit addressed this issue in Haavistola v. Cmty.
Fire Co. of Rising Sun, where the court had to decide whether a
110. Id. at *14–15.
111. Id. at *15–16.
112. Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
113. Id. at *16–17.
114. Id. at *16–17.
115. Id. at *17.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id; See also Hall v. Del. Council on Crime & Justice, 780 F. Supp. 241, 244 (D. Del.
1992), aff’d, 975 F.2d 1549 (3d Cir. 1992), where the court concluded that the defendant
was not an employer because it did not have the required minimum of fifteen employees. The
plaintiff argued that certain volunteers were employees, but the court rejected the plaintiff’s
argument. Id. The only benefits to which the volunteers were entitled were free admission to
an annual luncheon and reimbursement for work-related expenses. Id. The court cited Smith v.
Berks Cmty. Television, 657 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1987), for the proposition that volunteers
are not covered under Title VII, and that Title VII focuses on “compensation, terms,
conditions or privileges of employment.” Hall, 780 F. Supp. at 244 (citing Smith, 657 F. Supp.
at 794) (emphasis added). Predictably, the court determined that these forms of
“compensation” were insufficient to establish an employment relationship. Id.
119. See also Day v. Jeannette Baseball Ass’n, No. 12-267, 2013 WL 5786457, at *4
(W.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2013) (observing that the common-law, multi-factor analysis is not
applicable if the individual in question does not meet the threshold requirement of being a
“hired party”). But see Houston v. Twp. of Randolph, 934 F. Supp. 2d 711, 739 n.26 (D.N.J.
2013) (noting that the determination of employee status is based on the amount of control the
“employer” has over the manner and means by which the work is completed).
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volunteer firefighter could pursue a Title VII claim. 120 This case
involved a sexual assault and an indefinite suspension, 121 but the
critical issue was whether the plaintiff was an employee. 122 The court
started by quoting Title VII’s text and then framed the issue as being
whether a member of a fire department “who receives no direct
remuneration” is protected by Title VII. 123 Citing to cases involving
the employee/independent contractor distinction, 124 the court noted
the importance of the control the defendant had over the plaintiff,
but it then noted that the control “loses some of its significance”
when “compensation is not evident.” 125 The court then focused on
how this issue should be resolved with volunteers. 126 The court relied
on the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Graves, 127 the Eighth Circuit’s use
of Title VII’s legislative history, 128 and the Eighth Circuit’s reliance
on the dictionary definitions of the relevant terms and concluded:
[C]entral to the meaning of these words is the idea of
compensation in exchange for services: an employer is someone
who pays, directly or indirectly, wages or a salary or other
compensation to the person who provides the services—that person
being the employee. Compensation by the putative employer to the
putative employee in exchange for his services is not a sufficient
condition, but it is an essential condition to the existence of an
employer-employee relationship. 129

120. Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 6 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 1993).
121. Id. at 213–14.
122. Id. at 219.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 219–20. The cases to which the Fourth Circuit referred were Garrett v. Phillips
Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1983), and Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126 (1947).
125. Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 220.
126. Id. at 220–21. Specifically, the court discussed Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo
Ass’n, 907 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1990), and Smith v. Berks Cmty. Television, 657 F. Supp. 794
(E.D. Pa. 1987).
127. Graves, 907 F.2d at 71. See infra this Part.
128. Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 220. The legislative history to which the court referred was
the portion of the Congressional Register that noted that the “dictionary definitions” of
“employee” and “employer” should govern those words’ meanings. See 110 CONG. REC. 7216
(1964). As noted earlier, the court also cited to Berks Community Television, which relied on
legislative history for the idea that volunteers are not covered under Title VII. Haavistola, 6
F.3d at 221 (quoting Berks Cmty. Television, 657 F. Supp. at 795)).
129. Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 220 (quoting Graves, 907 F.2d at 73) (emphasis added).
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After discussing Graves and Smith, the court concluded that the
current case fell somewhere between the two because the plaintiff
did not receive any direct compensation, but she did receive some
benefits. 130 Specifically, the plaintiff received a disability pension,
survivors’ benefits, scholarships for dependents in case of disability or
death, a state flag in the event of death while serving in the line of
duty, group life insurance, tuition reimbursement, workers’
compensation coverage, tax benefits, the ability to buy a special
registration plate, access to certification to become a paramedic, and
some other benefits under federal law. 131 The district court had
concluded that the plaintiff was a volunteer, but the Fourth Circuit
concluded that this determination could not be made as a matter of
law. 132 Rather, the issue of whether the benefits “represent[ed]
indirect but significant remuneration as [the plaintiff] contends or
inconsequential incidents of an otherwise gratuitous relationship as
[the defendant] argues . . .” 133 was a question of fact; if the factfinder
determined that the relationship was a gratuitous one, the plaintiff
could not pursue her claim. 134
Thus, this is another example of where, instead of addressing
whether volunteers should be able to pursue discrimination claims, the
court avoided the issue by focusing on whether the plaintiff was truly
a volunteer. 135 And it is another example of a court requiring an initial
inquiry into remuneration when evaluating employment status.
130. Id. at 221.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 221–22.
133. Id. at 222. In a district court case from within the Fourth Circuit, the court
determined that there was a question of fact regarding whether the “employer’s” payment of
an intern’s tuition “constitute[d] ‘indirect but significant remuneration’ or ‘inconsequential
incidents of an otherwise gratuitous relationship.’” See Wooten v. Epworth United Methodist
Church, No. 1:06-CV-778, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50716, at *15–16 (M.D.N.C. July 11,
2007) (quoting Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 222).
134. Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 222. On remand, the jury concluded that the plaintiff was not
an employee. Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 839 F. Supp. 372, 373 (D. Md. 1994).
135. The court was, however, acknowledging that volunteers could not pursue federal
discrimination claims; if they could, then the inquiry into the plaintiff’s status would not have
been necessary. See also Finkle v. Howard Cty., Md., 12 F. Supp. 3d 780, 784–87 (D. Md.
2014) (following Haavistola and concluding that a person applying for a volunteer position
could pursue a Title VII claim because of the “line-of-duty” benefits available to the plaintiff).
But see Evans v. Wilkinson, 609 F. Supp. 2d 489 (D. Md. 2009) (deciding that the plaintiff
was not an employee despite the existence of a “length of service” benefits program,
homeowner’s assistance for first-time homeowners, and a scholarship program); Blankenship v.
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Recently, the Fifth Circuit determined that remuneration was
critical to an employment relationship, and that before a court looks
to other factors, there must first be a finding of sufficient
remuneration. 136 In Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, a
volunteer firefighter sued under Title VII. 137 The court noted that
“the existence of an employment relationship in the volunteer
context [was] an issue of first impression,” and provided a thorough
analysis of the issue. 138 The court cited the Supreme Court’s
observation that Title VII’s definition of “employee” was
“completely circular and explain[ed] nothing.” 139
The court then noted that when a statute provided such an
unhelpful definition, Congress intended courts to utilize the
“conventional master-servant relationship as understood by
common-law agency doctrine.” 140 After discussing the common-law
test, the court addressed how to apply the test to the volunteer
situation. 141 After analyzing how other courts have handled this issue,
the court ultimately sided with the majority approach. 142

City of Portsmouth, 372 F. Supp. 2d 496, 500 (E.D. Va. 2005), (noting that the plaintiff, an
auxiliary police officer who was bringing suit under the ADEA and under Title VII, was not an
employee under either statute because he did not receive compensation or monetary benefits).
136. Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 439 (5th Cir. 2013).
137. Id. at 432.
138. Id. at 432–38.
139. Id. at 434 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992)).
The Fifth Circuit also noted that prior to this opinion, the district courts within the Fifth Circuit
had reached different conclusions regarding how to analyze this issue. Id. at 435 n.2.
140. Id. at 434 (quoting Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 380 F.3d 219, 226 (5th Cir. 2004),
rev’d on other grounds, 546 U.S. 500 (2006)); see also Gulino v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 460
F.3d 361, 371 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Supreme Court has stressed that, ‘when Congress has
used the term “employee” without defining it, . . . Congress intended to describe the
conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.’”)
(quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1989)).
141. Juino, 717 F.3d at 434. Specifically, the court described the test in the
following manner:
The economic-realities portion of the test asks whether putative employees, “as a
matter of economic reality, are dependent upon the business to which they render
service.” The common law control portion of the test, which courts should
emphasize over the economic realities portion, assesses “the extent to which the one
for whom the work is being done has the right to control the details and means by
which the work is to be performed.”
Id. (citations omitted). The court then went on to describe the factors that were relevant to
this analysis:
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The court concluded that “[l]ike the majority of our sister
circuits, we will ‘turn to common-law principles to analyze the
character of an economic relationship only in situations that plausibly
approximate an employment relationship.’” 143 According to the
court, it was Congress’s role to change this situation if Congress felt
it was necessary to protect individuals such as the plaintiff. 144 This is
one more example of a United States Court of Appeals adopting the
majority approach and requiring an inquiry into remuneration before
evaluating other aspects of the at-issue relationship.

(1) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether the work usually is done
under the direction of a supervisor or is done by a specialist without supervision; (2)
the skill required in the particular occupation; (3) whether the “employer” or the
individual in question furnishes the equipment used and the place of work; (4) the
length of time during which the individual has worked; (5) the method of payment,
whether by time or by the job; (6) the manner in which the work relationship is
terminated [,] i.e., by one or both parties, with or without notice and explanation;
(7) whether annual leave is afforded; (8) whether the work is an integral part of the
business of the “employer”[,] (9) whether the worker accumulates retirement
benefits; (10) whether the “employer” pays social security taxes; and (11) the
intention of the parties.
Id. at 434–35 (quoting Diggs v. Harris Hosp.-Methodist, Inc., 847 F.2d 270, 272–73
(5th Cir. 1988)).
142. Id. at 435–39 (“After consideration of both approaches, we adopt the thresholdremuneration test, as we find it uniquely suited to assessing a plausible employment
relationship within the volunteer context. In support, we conclude that O’Connor is persuasive,
i.e., that a volunteer is distinguishable from the employee-independent contractor situation
because there is a prerequisite of a ‘hire’ in the latter . . . . This point is further borne out by the
fact that a volunteer is generally not an ‘employee,’ and thus no ‘hire’ has occurred since there is no
receipt of remuneration supporting an employer-employee relationship.”) (emphasis added)
(relying on O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1997) and on the EEOC
Compliance Manual § 2-III(A)(1)(c)).
143. Id. at 439 (quoting O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 115).
144. Id. (citing O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 119). The court then analyzed the type of
remuneration the plaintiff received (a $2.00-per-call fee, life insurance, uniform and badge,
firefighting gear, and firefighter training) and concluded that these benefits were not sufficient
to establish an employment relationship. Id. at 439–40. In a pre-Juino opinion, the Southern
District of Texas concluded that a plaintiff was not an employee despite the fact he would have
been able to take certification courses at no cost, make connections with individuals who might
have been able to help him obtain permanent employment, and obtain experience that would
have made him a more attractive candidate for a full-time position. See Moran v. Harris Cty.,
No. H-07-582, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64673, at *3–4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2007). When
distinguishing between employees and volunteers, the court stated the following: “What
distinguishes an employee from a volunteer is that in exchange for his labor, an employee is
paid—directly or indirectly—money.” Moran, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64673, at *3.
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The Seventh Circuit has not yet addressed this issue, but district
courts within that circuit have done so, with inconsistent results.145
In Holder v. Town of Bristol, the plaintiff was a volunteer reserve
police officer who was subjected to sexual harassment and eventually
resigned. 146 The court concluded that the plaintiff was not an
employee; the defendant was not an employer; and therefore, the
plaintiff could not pursue his claim. 147 There were thirteen full-time
employees, although there would be as many as twenty-five
employees if the reserve police officers were considered employees. 148
When addressing the officers’ status, the plaintiff urged the court to
use the “economic realities” test. 149 The court noted that this test is
more appropriate when distinguishing between employees and
independent contractors, and that using the economic realities test in
the volunteer context is “like using a screwdriver when the job
calls for a wrench.” 150
The court in Holder noted that other courts “uniformly held
that remuneration in exchange for services is an essential condition
to the existence of an employer-employee relationship.” 151 The court
also recognized that remuneration need not be direct; salaries or an
hourly wage are not essential. 152 In fact, the court addressed cases in
which one of the benefits was an increase in the chance of being
hired on a full-time basis. 153
145. See e.g., Holder v. Town of Bristol, No. 3:09-CV-32(PPS), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
85878 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 17, 2009); Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad, No. 11 C 04920, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171623 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2012). More recently, another district court from
within the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the circuit split on this topic and the fact that the
Seventh Circuit has not yet answered this question. See Geraty v. Village of Antioch, No. 09 C
6992, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158861, at *4–19 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2014).
146. Holder, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85878, at *1.
147. Id. at *17–18.
148. Id. at *5.
149. Id. at *5–6.
150. Id. at *6–7.
151. Id. at *7 (relying on York v. Ass’n of the Bar of N.Y., 286 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir.
2002); Daggitt v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, Local 304A, 245 F.3d
981, 987 (8th Cir. 2001); and Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1244
(11th Cir. 1998)).
152. Holder, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85878, at *8.
153. Id. at *12. One of the cases to which the court referred was Rafi v. Thompson, No.
02-2356 (JR), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78696, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2006), where the
plaintiff was able to continue with his Title VII claim after he alleged that his volunteer
position provided a “clear pathway to employment.”
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Eventually, the court analyzed the benefits the plaintiff
received. 154 These included the use of police equipment, a uniform, a
dry-cleaning allowance, workers’ compensation and disability
insurance, a life insurance policy if death were to occur in the line of
duty, training, and the possibility of future employment with the
department. 155 In the court’s view, these benefits were insufficient,
because some were “incidental to [the plaintiff’s] volunteer duties
and ha[d] no independent value,” 156 the insurance benefits were not
“guaranteed,” and the policies benefitted the town as much as they
benefitted the plaintiff. 157 Finally, the court concluded that the
training and the potential for permanent employment were
insufficient to create an employment relationship: 158 “without
more . . . training related to the volunteer duties, networking
opportunities, and the possibility of future employment aren’t
appreciable enough to create an employment relationship.” 159 The
court therefore concluded that the relationship was “more akin to
community service than gainful employment.” 160 Thus, the plaintiff
could not pursue his claim. 161
154. Holder, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85878, at *13.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at *14.
158. Id. at *15−17.
159. Id. at *15 (relying on York v. Ass’n of the Bar of N.Y.C., 286 F.3d 122, 126 (2d
Cir. 2002) and Moran v. Harris Cnty., No. H-07-582, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64673, at *1
(S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2007)). Similarly, in Moran, the court noted that “[w]hat distinguishes an
employee from a volunteer is that in exchange for his labor, an employee is paid—directly or
indirectly—money.” 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64673, at *3. The court concluded that
networking opportunities, the ability to take “classes at no cost,” and the possibility of “onthe-job experience filling in for actual deputy constables” were not sufficient to establish an
employment relationship. Id.
160. Holder, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85878, at *17.
161. Id. at *17−18. For another district court opinion from within the Seventh Circuit,
see Doe v. Lee, 943 F. Supp. 2d 870 (N.D. Ill. 2013). In Doe, the court acknowledged that
although the control test is usually a good way to distinguish between employees and
independent contractors, that test is not ideal when distinguishing between employees and
volunteers. Id. at 875. The plaintiff in Doe served in two capacities; on some occasions, she
served “as an intern,” and on other occasions she assisted the police with sting operations. Id.
at 876. After reviewing several of the cases cited in this Article, the court determined that
while the plaintiff was an intern, she was not an “employee.” Id. at 876−77. With respect to
her role in the sting operations, the plaintiff received a reduction in the balance of her
outstanding parking tickets; she signed a document that described these sting operations as
“temporary employment”; the plaintiff was covered under workers’ compensation insurance;
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More recently, another district court from within the Seventh
Circuit adopted the minority approach and looked at remuneration
as only one factor to use when evaluating employment status. 162 In
Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad, the court looked at the totality of
the circumstances when deciding whether an individual was an
employee. 163 Relying on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 164 the court noted that employee
status is determined only by evaluating numerous factors of the atissue relationship. 165
The court also referred to the EEOC Compliance Manual and
noted that when evaluating this issue, courts should look to all
factors of the relationship, and that no one factor is dispositive.166
The court in Volling noted that the Seventh Circuit “has squarely
rejected the ‘tyranny of labels’ advocated by the defendants in
brandishing the term ‘volunteer’ as a shield to ward off liability
under Title VII.” 167 The court also cited with approval the Sixth
Circuit’s opinion in Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc.: 168
As the Sixth Circuit noted in Bryson, treating remuneration only as
one of many factors bearing on the issue of status as an “employee”

her supervisor controlled if and when the plaintiff would participate in these operations; these
characteristics, among other factors, made this relationship appear to be a more typical
“employment” relationship. Id. As a result, the court determined that there was a fact issue
regarding whether the plaintiff was an employee when she participated in the sting
operations. Id.
162. Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad, No. 11 C 04920, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
171623, at *20−35 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2012). I realize the discussion of this case could be
placed in the next Section of this Article, but I placed it in this Section to avoid separating
district court opinions from within the same circuit.
163. Id. at *21−24. The district court relied partially on EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown
& Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 705 (7th Cir. 2002), for the proposition that a court should look at
several factors when determining whether an individual is an employee under Title VII.
Volling, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171623, at *23−24. The court also relied on the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992). Volling, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171623, at *21−28.
164. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
165. Volling, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171623, at *22 (quoting Cmty. for Creative NonViolence, 490 U.S. at 751−52).
166. Id. at *22. See supra note 36 for a list of factors the EEOC considers when
determining employee status.
167. Volling, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171623, at *23.
168. 656 F.3d 348 (6th Cir. 2011). Bryson will be addressed in Section IV.B of
this Article.
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“comports with Darden’s instruction that, when evaluating a
particular relationship, ‘all of the incidents of the relationship must
be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive.’” Based
on the Supreme Court’s instructions, the Court agrees with the
Sixth Circuit’s view. The question and degree of remuneration are
simply factors to be considered, along with many others, in assessing
whether a worker is an “employee” for purposes of Title VII. 169

In addition, the court stated the following regarding the need to
look at the totality of the circumstances rather than solely at the
remuneration issue:
It is clear that remuneration is an important factor in defining an
employment relationship. But the Supreme Court’s instruction to
evaluate the question using the common-law principles of agency,
and its inclusion of considerations that do not pertain to
remuneration on its non-exhaustive list of relevant factors, confirms
that it is not the exclusive consideration. Consistent with that
instruction, this Court does not draw any bright line requiring an
“employee” to be salaried or that she receive substantial pecuniary
remuneration. The question is whether the plaintiffs have alleged
facts sufficient to make a plausible claim that they meet the
requirements for Title VII protection . . . . 170

After evaluating the various factors, the court decided that the
plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.171
Therefore, this court determined that the totality-of-thecircumstances test was the applicable test, and that remuneration was
only one factor in that analysis. 172 Until the Seventh Circuit answers

169. Volling, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171628, at *26 (internal citations omitted) (citing
Bryson, 656 F.3d at 354).
170. Id. at *33. In reaching the holding, the court noted that the defendants controlled
which shifts the plaintiffs worked; the “[p]laintiffs []were required to wear uniforms”; the
plaintiffs “had to go through probationary periods”; and there was a “well-defined chain of
command.” Id. at *30−31. All of these facts demonstrated a level of control which the
defendant had over the plaintiff. Id. at *30−32.
171. Id. at *32−33 (stating that “[a] workplace is not necessarily any different for a noncompensated volunteer than it is for a compensated ’employee,’ and while both are generally
free to quit if they don’t like the conditions (at-will employment being the norm), neither
should have to quit to avoid sexual, racial, or other unlawful discrimination and harassment”).
172. Id. at *33. But see Love v. Cmty. Nutrition Network, No. 09-CV-4937, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 133011, at *24−26 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2010) (prior to the Volling opinion, the
Northern District of Illinois appeared to endorse the threshold remuneration test).
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this question, there will continue to be uncertainty within
that jurisdiction.
The Eighth Circuit addressed the status of volunteers when it
handed down its often-cited decision in Graves v. Women’s Prof’l
Rodeo Ass’n, where a man sued the Women’s Professional Rodeo
Association (WPRA), claiming it violated Title VII by not allowing
him to participate in WPRA events. 173 The court addressed whether
WPRA members were employees; if they were employees, the WPRA
would be subject to Title VII’s prohibitions. 174 If the members were
not employees, the WPRA would be immune from Title VII
liability. 175 The district court noted that the “WPRA . . . [did] not
pay wages, withhold taxes, or pay insurance.” 176 Although the WPRA
had rules regarding WPRA events, that level of control was not
critical in determining whether the members were employees. 177
The court also focused on the ordinary usage and dictionary
definitions of the relevant terms, including “employee,” “employer,”
and “employ.” 178 Relying on the definitions of those terms in
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 179 the court
concluded the following:
[C]entral to the meaning of these words is the idea of
compensation in exchange for services: an employer is someone
who pays, directly or indirectly, wages or a salary or other
compensation to the person who provides services—that person
being the employee. Compensation by the putative employer to the
putative employee in exchange for his services is not a sufficient
condition, but it is an essential condition to the existence of an
employer-employee relationship. 180

The court then noted that the WPRA does not compensate its
members; the competition winners are paid by event sponsors; and
that “[f]or most [WPRA] members, belonging to WPRA and
173. 907 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1990).
174. Id. at 72.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 73. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit looked at the definitions of “employee,”
“employer,” and “employ.” Id.
179. Id. (citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 743 (unabridged) (1981)).
180. Id.
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competing on the professional rodeo circuit is not a remunerative
proposition.” 181 In concluding that members of the WPRA are not
employees, the court observed the following: “The relationship
between WPRA and its members simply bears no resemblance to
that between an employer and employee . . . : no compensation is
made, only prize money won . . . . In addition, membership in
WPRA entails no duty of service to WPRA or anyone else . . . .” 182
Finally, the court emphasized the importance of the first part of
the two-part inquiry regarding employment status. 183 Specifically, the
court referred to that inquiry regarding an employment relationship
as a “crucial and elementary initial inquiry” that could not be
avoided. 184 The court then concluded that the relationship between
the WPRA and its members was not even close to an employment
relationship. 185 The court stated the following: “[T]he absence of any
compensation flowing to WPRA members by reason of their
membership, together with the absence of any duty of service owed
by members to WPRA . . . , suffices to exclude WPRA from being an
‘employer’ of its members under Title VII . . . .” 186 Thus, this is
another court requiring a plaintiff to overcome the remuneration test
before even attempting to argue any additional test for establishing
employee status. This is the majority approach, with most courts
deciding there must be sufficient remuneration before someone can
be considered an employee. 187

181. Id.
182. Id. In further rejecting the plaintiff’s argument, the court noted the following:
Courts have turned to analyses such as the “economic realities” test and “right to
control” test under Title VII only in situations that plausibly approximate an
employment relationship. In the case at hand, WPRA is so unlike an employer to its
members that plunging into questions of control or economic realities is on the order
of considering whether mitigating circumstances were present during the commission
of a crime before determining whether there is a corpus delicti. Id. at 74.
183. Id. at 73.
184. Id. The court’s exact language was the following: “Only by skipping this crucial
and elementary initial inquiry—whether there exists an employment relationship, according to
the ordinary meaning of the words—and jumping straight into verbal manipulation of the case
law tests for an employment relationship, can Graves make an implausible argument sound
even marginally plausible.” Id. at 73.
185. Id. at 73–74.
186. Id. at 74.
187. See infra and supra this Part.
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The Tenth Circuit also requires sufficient remuneration before
an individual can be considered an employee. 188 In McGuinness v.
Univ. of New Mexico Sch. of Med., the plaintiff brought several ADA
claims against a medical school. 189 The lower court granted summary
judgment for the defendant, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 190 In its
opinion, the Tenth Circuit eventually addressed the plaintiff ’s
“association discrimination” claim. 191 That claim fell under Title I of
the ADA, which governs employment. 192 Thus, the student had to
establish an employment relationship between him and the medical
school. 193 The court concluded that no such relationship existed:
“[The plaintiff] has failed to show the existence of such an
employment relationship between himself and the medical school.
Unless a student receives remuneration for the work he performs, he
is not considered an employee.” 194
The court emphasized the lack of remuneration, and it stated
that the following facts were irrelevant in determining whether an
employment relationship existed: (1) the plaintiff “completed federal
employment applications”; (2) the plaintiff “took a federal oath of
office”; and (3) the plaintiff “was covered by the New Mexico Tort
Claims Act . . . .” The court ended its discussion by noting that a
university “may confer certain benefits on an individual and exercise
a modicum of control over him without establishing a master-servant
relationship.” 195 Thus, the plaintiff was not an employee, and his
ADA “association discrimination” claim failed. 196 The Tenth Circuit
188. McGuinness v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 170 F.3d 974 (10th Cir. 1998). But
see Scott v. City of Minco, 393 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1190 (W.D. Okla. 2005), where a district
court within the Tenth Circuit stated that when determining employment status, a “[c]ourt
must consider the totality of the circumstances.” The court in Scott then noted that courts use
a “hybrid test,” which looks at both remuneration and the level of control the putative
employer exercises over the putative employee. Id.
189. McGuinness, 170 F.3d at 976−77.
190. Id. at 977.
191. Id. at 977–80.
192. Id. at 979.
193. Id.
194. Id. (relying on O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1997) and 5 U.S.C.
§ 5351(2) (2012)).
195. Id. (relying on Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo Ass’n, Inc., 907 F.2d 71, 72−73
(8th Cir. 1990)).
196. McGuinness, 170 F.3d at 979. The court also noted that the plaintiff failed to
establish that the medical school discriminated against him. Id. at 980.
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therefore appears to be another court that requires a preliminary
inquiry into remuneration before looking at other aspects of the
“employment” relationship.
The Eleventh Circuit has also decided that whether an individual
qualifies as an employee hinges on remuneration. 197 In Llampallas v.
Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., the court addressed whether the plaintiff
was an employee of a condominium association. 198 The plaintiff
served as a member and vice president of the association. 199 When
the other board members ousted her, she sued both the
condominium association and her true “employer” under Title
VII. 200 The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, but the
Eleventh Circuit reversed. 201
Before addressing the merits of the Title VII claim, the court
determined whether the plaintiff was an employee of the
condominium association. 202 The court noted that Title VII prohibits
discrimination against “any individual,” and that the plaintiff could
have tried to argue that because of this language, she was protected
under the statute. 203 The court then dismissed the argument, relying
on precedent which had determined that only employees could sue
under Title VII. 204 Also, relying on Congressional intent, the court
observed that “Congress intended to limit the scope of the Act to
specific employment relationships; thus, the statute provides relief
only against ‘employers’ as defined under the statute . . . . Hence,
courts have almost universally held that the scope of the term ‘any
individual’ is limited to employees.” 205

197. Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1998).
198. Id. at 1242−44.
199. Id. at 1241.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1239.
202. Id. at 1242−44.
203. Id. at 1242−43.
204. Id. (relying on McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir. 1972);
Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir. 1997); Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med.
Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 1996); and Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C.,
794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 1986), abrogated by Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v.
Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003)). But see id. at 1243 (citing Sibley Mem’l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488
F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (providing a broad interpretation of Title VII and not
limiting the term “individual” to “employees”).
205. Llampallas, 163 F.3d at 1243.
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The court also concluded that Title VII’s forms of relief
provided evidence that only employees were protected. 206 To reach
this conclusion, the court also focused on Title VII’s 1972
amendments, which used the phrase “employees or applicants
for employment.” 207
The court then turned to Title VII’s definition of “employee.” 208
Noting that the definition was not useful, the court stated that “only
individuals who receive compensation from an employer can be
deemed ‘employees’ under the statute.” 209 Relying on O’Connor, the
court observed: “Where no financial benefit is obtained by the
purported employee from the employer, no plausible employment
relationship of any sort can be said to exist because . . .
compensation . . . is an essential condition to the existence of an
employer-employee relationship.”210 Because the plaintiff did not
receive compensation from the condominium association, she was
not an employee. 211 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit is yet another court
to follow the majority approach and require remuneration before the
court engages in further analysis of the employment relationship.
Finally, although the D.C. Circuit has not directly addressed this
issue, a district court within the D.C. Circuit focused on the benefits
the plaintiff received in order to determine employment status. 212 In
Rafi v. Thompson, the court addressed whether the volunteer
positions the plaintiff sought at the National Human Genome
Research Institute and the National Institutes of Health constituted

206. Id. (observing that Title VII allows for reinstatement, hiring, and back pay, which
are remedies that would not be applicable to volunteers).
207. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-261, § 717, 86 Stat. 103, 111 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1994));
and H.R. REP. NO. 92-238 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2159−60).
208. Llampallas, 163 F.3d at 1243.
209. Id. (relying on O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115−16 (2d Cir. 1997)).
210. Id. at 1243 (quoting O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 115−16).
211. Id. at 1244. For a more recent case from a district court within the Eleventh
Circuit, see Vazquez v. Orange Cty. Service Unit, No. 6:12-CV-1595-Orl-37(DAB), 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 32728, at *5–78 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2014), where the court noted that an
employment relationship is most often indicated by whether the individual is on the employer’s
payroll, that one must receive compensation to be considered an employee, and that
compensation was the equivalent of salary or wages.
212. Rafi v. Thompson, No. 02-2356 (JR), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78696 (D.D.C.
Oct. 30, 2006).
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“employment.” 213 The court had previously addressed this issue and
asked the parties to conduct additional discovery. 214 The court did so
because it had earlier decided that one of the benefits, “a clear
pathway to employment . . . might constitute sufficient
compensation to bring [National Institutes of Health] volunteers
under Title VII.” 215 The plaintiff identified several former volunteers
who were hired as full-time employees. 216 Additionally, the plaintiff
argued that the volunteer position would have provided him with an
“increased opportunity to participate in [National Institutes of
Health’s]” genetics program, which would have provided him with
training in his fields of expertise. 217 Relying on Haavistola, the court
concluded that the plaintiff “made a plausible showing that the
volunteer positions for which he applied would qualify as
‘employment’ under Title VII and the ADEA.” 218 Thus, it appeared
that the court was looking at remuneration (albeit a different type of
remuneration) as a threshold issue to evaluate when
determining employment status. 219
When determining employment status, most courts look at the
issue of remuneration before evaluating other factors. Although this
is the majority approach, some courts ignore the threshold
remuneration issue and look to the totality of the circumstances
when making this determination; the courts that take this approach
do so based, in part, on the Supreme Court’s instructions on this

213. Id. at *1.
214. Id. at *1–2.
215. Id. at *1.
216. Id. at *2.
217. Id. at *3.
218. Id. at *3. Although the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff on this issue, it also
noted that more evidence from the plaintiff would be required in order for him to “establish
his prima facie case of disparate treatment in hiring.” Id. at *4–5.
219. See also Dean v. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emp., 509 F. Supp. 2d 39, 52–56 (D.D.C.
2007), where the court seemed to rely on the threshold remuneration test but also engaged in
a multi-factor analysis.
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issue, 220 and on a provision of the EEOC Compliance Manual, which
also requires a totality-of-the-circumstances approach. 221
B. The Minority Approach
Although most courts require an initial inquiry into
remuneration before looking at other aspects of the parties’
relationship, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits take a different
approach. 222 Specifically, those courts look at remuneration simply as
one factor when deciding the nature of the relationship. 223 Cases
from the Sixth and Ninth Circuits will be addressed in this Section of
the Article, immediately following a discussion of a district court
opinion from within the First Circuit, which took a similar approach.
The District of Massachusetts addressed this issue in Mahoney v.
Morgan when it had to decide whether a volunteer could count
toward the fifteen-employee threshold under the ADA. 224 The court
addressed the employment status of several individuals (and
repeatedly referred to the multi-factor analysis while evaluating the
individuals’ employment status). One of the individuals, the husband
of the owner of a veterinary clinic, performed some “work” but was
not paid. 225 The court had to decide whether this individual qualified
as an employee and referred to Reid, Clackamas, Darden, and the
EEOC’s position regarding the need to look at the totality of the
circumstances, not simply at remuneration. 226 In fact, the court
220. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Also, some of the courts that have
adopted the threshold remuneration test have argued that because there was an obvious
payment in all three Supreme Court cases, the Court bypassed its analysis of the threshold
remuneration test.
221. See EEOC Compl. Man. § 2-III(A)(1). See also supra notes 36, 37, 67 and
accompanying text.
222. See infra Section IV.B. Although the First Circuit has not directly addressed this
issue, a district court from within the First Circuit relied on a First Circuit case and adopted a
totality-of-the-circumstances approach. Mahoney v. Morgan, No. 08-10879-MBB, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 97224 (D. Mass. Sept. 16, 2010) (relying on Lopez v. Massachusetts, 588 F.3d 69
(1st Cir. 2009)). In Mahoney, the court noted that lack of remuneration was not solely
determinative of employee status. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97224, at *23–24.
223. See infra Section IV.B.
224. Mahoney, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97224, at *16–17.
225. Id. at *23–24.
226. Id. at *17–20. Admittedly, although the court identified several factors to evaluate
when determining employment status, the court focused on the type of “payment” the
owner’s husband received, which could come in the form of “benefits.” Id. at *23–24.
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started its discussion of employment status by apparently rejecting
the threshold remuneration test and noting that the husband did not
receive payment but that “[t]he lack of evidence of payment . . . is
not necessarily a bar to a determination of employee status because
some volunteers are covered by the ADA.” 227
Relying on the EEOC’s Compliance Manual, the court observed
that an individual can be an employee if he receives benefits in
exchange for services. 228 Here, the individual was covered under his
wife’s health insurance plan, and the court believed that this was one
factor that weighed in favor of finding employee status. 229 In
concluding this issue, the court stated: “[A] reasonable jury could
find that [the husband] qualifies as an employee.” 230 In reaching this
conclusion, the court relied on a case from the First Circuit that
appeared to adopt the minority multi-factor test, but emphasized the
issue of control. 231 Therefore, although the First Circuit has not yet
definitively adopted a position regarding how to determine the
employment status of a “volunteer,” at least one district court from
within that jurisdiction has appeared to adopt the totality-of-thecircumstances test. 232
However, the court used all factors when evaluating other individuals’ employment status.
Id. at *21–24.
227. Id. at *23. Although some courts have determined that some “volunteers” are
covered under federal anti-discrimination statutes, those courts actually decided that those
individuals were not truly volunteers, but employees; true volunteers are not covered by federal
anti-discrimination statutes under current precedent.
228. Id. at *24. In addition to relying on the EEOC Compliance Manual, the court also
relied on the previously discussed Supreme Court Clackamas opinion, in which the Court
looked at several factors (and focused on the level of control), and on the First Circuit opinion
in Lopez, which similarly focused on control, but evaluated the totality of the circumstances.
Mahoney, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97224, at *18–19. Admittedly, the Mahoney court focused
on the benefits the individual received, but it is clear that the court evaluated all factors, not
simply remuneration, throughout its analyses of the employment status of the various atissue individuals.
229. Mahoney, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97224, at *23–24.
230. Id. at *24.
231. See id. at *17–28. Specifically, the court relied on Lopez v. Massachusetts, 588 F.3d
69, 84–85 (1st Cir. 2009) (utilizing the multi-factor test articulated in the EEOC Compliance
Manual, and focusing on the issue of control). Lopez did not, however, involve volunteers. Id.
at 72–73. The Mahoney court also cited to the Supreme Court’s opinions in Clackamas, Reid,
and Darden. Mahoney, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97224, at *18–20. See also supra note 228 and
accompanying text.
232. As noted previously, the First Circuit has applied the totality-of-the-circumstances
test, although that case did not involve volunteers. Lopez, 588 F.3d at 72–73.
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One of the few courts of appeals to avoid initially analyzing
remuneration when evaluating an “employment” relationship is the
Sixth Circuit. 233 In Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc.,
the plaintiff sued under Title VII. 234 The court had to answer
whether volunteer firefighters were employees; if they were, the fire
department would have been subject to Title VII’s prohibitions. 235 If
they were not employees, the fire department would not have
reached the fifteen-employee minimum, and the district court would
have had to dismiss the case. 236 Although the EEOC determined that
the fire department was a covered employer, the district court
disagreed. 237 The district court decided that the “compensation
analysis is an antecedent inquiry that must be examined prior to
application of the economic realities or common-law agency tests.”238
After the parties conducted additional discovery, the district court
determined that the benefits were insufficient to create an
issue of fact. 239
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that, in some cases,
this is a mixed question of law and fact, which must be answered by
the factfinder. 240 The court then addressed Title VII’s relevant, but
unhelpful, definitions and how courts have determined employment
status. 241 The Sixth Circuit noted that the definition of “employee”
was not helpful, and that common law agency principles were
appropriate to apply. 242 The court then cited the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Darden and explained the factors that go into
determining whether an employment relationship exists; these factors
set out the specific “rules” for the relationship. 243

233. Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 656 F.3d 348 (6th Cir. 2011).
234. Id. at 350.
235. Id. at 350–51.
236. Id.
237. Id. The EEOC concluded that the firefighters were employees because the
department exercised sufficient control over the firefighters and because the firefighters were
compensated for their services despite not being on the department’s payroll. Id. at 350.
238. Id. at 351 (quoting Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d
527, 530 (N.D. Ohio 2008)).
239. Bryson, 656 F.3d at 351.
240. Id. at 352.
241. Id. at 352–55.
242. Id. at 352.
243. Id. (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992)).
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As previously noted, these factors are typically used in the
employee/independent contractor context, 244 and the court
acknowledged that it had not used this analysis to distinguish
between employees and volunteers. 245 The court first observed that
other courts had included remuneration as a factor in their
analyses. 246 Strangely, the courts to which the Sixth Circuit cited
actually used remuneration as a threshold inquiry. 247 In fact, several of
the opinions to which the Sixth Circuit cited were addressed in
Section IV.A of this Article. 248 The court then addressed the EEOC’s
position that volunteers are not usually protected, but that an
individual could be a protected employee if he receives sufficient
benefits. 249 And, as was noted, in this case, the EEOC had decided
that the firefighters were employees, in part because they were
compensated despite not being on the payroll. 250
The Sixth Circuit then decided that remuneration was not an
independent, antecedent inquiry. 251 Criticizing the district court’s
decision to adopt the Second Circuit’s test from United States v. City
of New York, 252 “which requires a plaintiff to establish first that she is
a ‘hired party’ by showing that she received ‘substantial benefits not
merely incidental to the activity performed,’ before the district court
may consider the common-law agency test,” the court observed
the following:
In this case, each individual firefighter-member is a “hired party” in
that each has a contractual relationship with the Department—the

244. Id. at 352.
245. Id. at 352–53.
246. Id. at 353.
247. Specifically, some of the cases the court cited for the proposition that remuneration
was a “factor” in this analysis include: Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236,
1243–44 (11th Cir. 1998); McGuinness v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 170 F.3d 974, 979 (10th
Cir. 1998); Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 6 F.3d 211, 220–21 (4th Cir. 1993);
and Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo Ass’n, 907 F.2d 71, 73–74 (8th Cir. 1990). As was
discussed previously, the courts in these cases required remuneration as a threshold inquiry
before progressing to any other type of test to determine employment status. See supra
Section IV.A.
248. See supra Section IV.A.
249. Bryson, 656 F.3d at 353.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 353–55.
252. 359 F.3d 83, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2004).
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firefighter-member provides firefighting services to the Department
in exchange for benefits from the Department, including worker’s
compensation coverage, insurance coverage, gift cards, personal use
of the Department’s facilities and assets, training, and access to an
emergency fund. . . . But we decline to adopt the Second Circuit’s
view that, to be a “hired party,” a plaintiff must demonstrate that
she received significant remuneration. 253

The court then explained its conclusion, which was based on the
court’s belief that the cases upon which the Second Circuit relied did
not require an independent inquiry regarding remuneration. 254 The
court also noted that its approach was consistent with the Supreme
Court’s Darden opinion in that “no one factor” (including
remuneration) was dispositive. 255 Specifically, the court stated that
“no one factor, including remuneration, is decisive, and therefore no
one factor is an independent antecedent requirement.” 256 The court
also commented that the multi-factor test was appropriate because
“alleged employee-employer relationships can be complex and may
not fit neatly into one particular categorization.” 257
Applying its interpretation to the facts of the case, the court in
Bryson noted that the firefighters received workers’ compensation
coverage; they received insurance coverage; they received gift cards;
they were authorized to use the fire department’s facilities; and they
also had access to an emergency fund. 258 Also, some firefighters
received a lump-sum retirement payment while others received
hourly wages. 259 Because the district court failed to consider aspects
of the relationship other than remuneration, the Sixth Circuit
remanded the case back to the district court. 260

253. Bryson, 656 F.3d at 354.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 355.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 355–56. For a more recent opinion from a district court within the Sixth
Circuit, see Crim v. Village of Bellville, No. 1:12-CV-3065, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98367
(N.D. Ohio July 12, 2013). In Crim, the court followed Bryson and noted that in determining
whether an employment relationship exists, the court must apply the common-law agency test,
which looks at all aspects of the relationship, including remuneration. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
98367, at *10. But see Neff v. Civil Air Patrol, 916 F. Supp. 710 (S.D. Ohio 1996), where
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Judge Gibbons concurred in part and dissented in part. 261 She
believed that a remand was necessary but “disagree[d] with the
majority’s conclusion that, when evaluating whether an individual is
an ‘employee’ . . . the court must weigh remuneration as merely one
factor.” 262 Relying on Haavistola, Pietras, and Graves, 263 she noted
that a threshold showing of “indirect but significant remuneration”
or “significant benefits” was required to establish employee status. 264
Also, relying on United States v. City of New York, she observed:
First, the plaintiff must show she was hired by the putative
employer. To prove that she was hired, she must establish that she
received remuneration in some form from her work. This
remuneration need not be a salary, but must consist of substantial
benefits not merely incidental to the activity performed. Once
plaintiff furnishes proof that her putative employer remunerated
her for services she performed, we look to the thirteen factors
articulated by the Supreme Court in . . . Reid . . . , to determine
whether an employment relationship exists. 265

Relying on the majority approach, Judge Gibbons reiterated that
an application of a common-law agency test was appropriate only
after a finding that the relationship could “plausibly approximate an
employment relationship.” 266 And when there is no financial benefit
from the purported employer, there could be no “‘plausible’

the court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that she was an employee. The court applied the
economic realities test and decided that the “compensation” the plaintiff received (“emotional
benefit,” in-kind services, and death benefits if she was killed while working for the defendant)
was insufficient to confer employee status. Id. at 713–15. In reaching its conclusion, the court
noted that “[o]rdinarily, unpaid volunteers, whose livelihood does not depend upon their
volunteer position, are not susceptible to the same types of economic pressures as are paid
employees.” Id. at 712.
261. Bryson, 656 F.3d at 356–59 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
262. Id. at 356.
263. Id. at 358. See also supra Section IV.A. Judge Gibbons also relied on the Tenth
Circuit’s opinion in McGuiness v. University of New Mexico School of Medicine, 170 F.3d 974
(10th Cir. 1998).
264. Bryson, 656 F.3d at 357 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs of Farmingville Fire Dist., 180 F.3d 468, 473
(2d Cir. 1999)).
265. Id. at 358 (quoting United States v. City of New York, 359 F.3d 83, 91–92 (2d
Cir. 2004)) (citations omitted).
266. Id. (quoting O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1997)).
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employment relationship.” 267 Concluding, she stated that she
would have
. . . adopt[ed] the two-step test applied by other circuit courts:
first, the plaintiff must show that she was hired by the putative
employer by “establish[ing] that she received remuneration in
some form from her work,” and, second, after the plaintiff
establishes remuneration, the court will apply the common-law
agency test set forth in Darden and Reid “to determine whether an
employment relationship exists.” 268

Applying that test to the facts in Bryson, Judge Gibbons
determined that the appropriate result was a remand to allow a jury
to decide whether the benefits were “indirect but significant
remuneration . . . or inconsequential incidents of an otherwise
gratuitous relationship.” 269 Despite Judge Gibbons’ dissent, the Sixth
Circuit has adopted the totality-of-the-circumstances test, and does
not require courts to evaluate remuneration as a prerequisite to
establishing an employment relationship. 270
The Ninth Circuit also appears not to look at remuneration as a
threshold inquiry when determining employment status.271 In
Fichman v. Media Ctr., the court addressed whether two groups of
individuals were employees under the ADEA and/or the ADA after
the plaintiff brought suit under both statutes. 272 The two groups of
individuals were (1) members of the defendant’s board of directors;
and (2) volunteer producers who created television shows for the
defendant’s public access channels. 273 The court noted that if the
members of either of these groups were employees, the defendant
would be subject to both statutes’ requirements. 274 If none of these
267. Id. (relying on Davis, 126 F.3d at 115–16).
268. Id. at 358–59 (quoting City of New York, 359 F.3d at 91–92).
269. Id. at 359 (quoting Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 6 F.3d 211, 222
(4th Cir. 1993)).
270. For a more recent pronouncement from the Sixth Circuit, see Marie v. American
Red Cross, 771 F.3d 344, 353 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[T]hus, in this circuit, remuneration is not an
independent antecedent requirement, but rather it is a non[-]dispositive factor that should be
assessed in conjunction with the other Darden factors to determine if a volunteer is
an employee.”).
271. Fichman v. Media Ctr., 512 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
272. Id. at 1158.
273. Id. at 1160.
274. Id.
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individuals was an employee, the defendant would have been
immune from ADEA and ADA liability. 275 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant, and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed. 276
The Ninth Circuit first addressed the members of the board of
directors. 277 The court used the analysis the Supreme Court used in
Clackamas, 278 in which the Court had to decide whether physician
shareholders of a medical group were employees under the ADA. 279
In Clackamas, the Court noted that the word “employee” was
“intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as
understood by common-law agency doctrine.” 280 The Court listed
factors to evaluate when making that decision, and did not conduct
an independent inquiry regarding remuneration. 281 In applying
Clackamas and concluding that the members of the board of
directors were not employees, the court observed:
Under Clackamas, the district court properly concluded that the
members of the Board of Directors were not . . . employees. [The
defendant] does not hire or fire its directors: the Board selects its
own members. The directors each have full-time jobs independent
of [the defendant], and are not compensated by [the defendant].
Neither the travel reimbursement nor the food supplied at Board
meetings rises to the level of compensation. The personal
satisfaction and professional status several directors reported

275. Id.
276. Id. at 1159.
277. Id. at 1160.
278. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003). As noted
earlier, the Court has, on previous occasions, addressed the issue of an individual’s
employment status. See supra note 7.
279. Id. at 442.
280. Id. at 445 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322–
23 (1992)).
281. Id. at 449. Those factors were the following: “Whether the organization can hire or
fire the individual or set the rules and regulations of the individual’s work; [w]hether and, if so,
to what extent the organization supervises the individual’s work; [w]hether the individual
reports to someone higher in the organization; [w]hether and, if so, to what extent the
individual is able to influence the organization; [w]hether the parties intended that the
individual be an employee, as expressed in written agreements or contracts; and [w]hether the
individual shares in the profits, losses, and liabilities of the organization.” Id.
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gaining from their positions with [the defendant] are typical
benefits of volunteer work. 282

The court continued to analyze additional Clackamas factors and
concluded that the board members were not employees. 283 The only
benefit the board members received was officers’ and directors’
liability insurance, and the court concluded that this was not
sufficient to convert them into employees. 284 Finally, reasoning that
the term “employee” is interpreted uniformly under federal
employment laws, the court concluded that its ADA analysis was also
applicable to the ADEA claim. 285
Next, the court addressed whether the television show producers
were employees. 286 Once again, the court used Clackamas, and did
not look at remuneration as a separate inquiry; it simply looked at
remuneration as one factor. 287 In its analysis, the court noted the
following: “[The defendant] does not have the power to hire or fire
producers. It does not supervise them in a traditional employeremployee manner. The producers are not paid a salary, nor are they
entitled to employee benefits.” 288 By listing the pay issue with the
other factors, the court was not using remuneration as a threshold
inquiry; rather, it was looking at all factors and deciding whether the
producers were employees under Clackamas. 289 Unfortunately for
the plaintiff, the court decided these individuals were not employees
and that the plaintiff could not pursue his claims. 290 Although the
plaintiff lost this case, the opinion does provide some hope for
plaintiffs because it demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit has adopted
the minority position, which makes it slightly easier for plaintiffs to
282. Fichman v. Media Ctr., 512 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).
283. Id. at 1160–61.
284. Id. at 1161.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1161–62.
287. Id. at 1162.
288. Id. (emphasis added).
289. Id.
290. Id. More recently, the Ninth Circuit relied on Fichman for the proposition that
remuneration is not a dispositive issue. Waisgerber v. City of Los Angeles, 406 F. App’x 150 (9th
Cir. 2010). In Waisgerber, the court cited Fichman and observed the following: “As evidenced
by our discussion in Fichman, the fact that a person is not paid a salary does not necessarily
foreclose the possibility that the person is an ‘employee’ for purposes of federal statutes,
including Title VII.” Waisgerber, 406 F. App’x at 152 (relying on Fichman, 512 F.3d at 1161).
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prove employee status, regardless of whether that determination is
necessary to decide whether the plaintiff can sue, whether the
defendant is covered under federal anti-discrimination statutes, or
which statutory damage cap applies.
As this Section of this Article has demonstrated, there is a split
among the circuits regarding how courts decide employment status
under federal anti-discrimination laws. Most courts require a
threshold inquiry into remuneration, concluding that if there is
insufficient remuneration, there is no possibility of an employment
relationship. If, however, sufficient remuneration exists, the court
will then look at other aspects of the relationship. The minority of
courts look at remuneration simply as one factor when determining
whether an employment relationship exists. Regardless of which
approach the courts take, the end result is the same—individuals
whom courts determine to be “true” volunteers are left unprotected
by federal anti-discrimination statutes.
V. HOW CONGRESS, THE COURTS, AND THE EEOC CAN START
PROTECTING VOLUNTEERS
Assuming Congress, the courts, and the EEOC believe that
federal anti-discrimination statutes should protect volunteers, there
are several options to consider. 291 The first option is for Congress to
follow the Second and Fifth Circuits’ statements that Congress could
amend the statutes to cover volunteers. The second option is for the
courts to act. Specifically, the courts could do the following: (1) give
expansive interpretations to the relevant statutory terms; (2) adopt
the EEOC’s and the Supreme Court’s multi-factor test for
distinguishing between employees and independent contractors
rather than continuing the current practice (majority approach) of
requiring remuneration as a threshold inquiry before evaluating any
other factors; 292 (3) utilize previous Supreme Court precedent and

291. Although this Article argues that federal anti-discrimination statutes should apply to
volunteers, I do understand that one policy reason for keeping these statutes inapplicable to
volunteers is that if these statutes’ protections are expanded, entities might be less willing to
utilize volunteers and would therefore be forced to expend valuable resources and perhaps cut
services to the constituencies they serve.
292. See supra note 7 (referencing Supreme Court cases that addressed how to
determine employment status) and note 36 (listing factors from EEOC’s multi-factor test used
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allow anti-discrimination statutes to protect against “evils” that
might not have been the primary motivation behind the passage of
those statutes; and/or (4) similar to (1) above, follow the Supreme
Court’s and other courts’ pronouncements that anti-discrimination
statutes should be interpreted broadly. The third option is for the
EEOC to act. Specifically, the EEOC could change its position and
provide volunteers with protection against discrimination; however,
even if the EEOC does change its position, the courts will not be
bound to follow the new position if they believe it is not persuasive.
Regardless of which of these options (if any) occurs, individuals who
selflessly devote their time and effort to various causes should be
protected from discrimination. Similarly, entities that discriminate
against volunteers should not be able to reap the rewards of these
individuals’ work and then escape potential liability if they
discriminate against them.
A. Congress Can, and Should, Amend the Relevant Statutes
When courts issue rulings with which Congress disagrees,
Congress can amend the relevant statutes to ensure that the courts
will interpret them consistently with Congress’s intent. This has
happened on numerous occasions in the employment discrimination
context; for example, (1) Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
1991 in response to several Supreme Court opinions that weakened
Title VII; 293 and (2) Congress amended the ADA in response to
several Supreme Court opinions that weakened that statute. 294 As
courts narrowly interpret the relevant statutory terms, Congress can
take the opportunity to protect from discrimination those individuals
who are willing to give up their time to help entities that benefit
from these individuals’ commitment. 295 In fact, some courts have

to determine employment status); see also infra note 336 (addressing some courts’
interpretations of Supreme Court cases regarding this issue).
293. See
The
Civil
Rights
Act
of
1991,
EEOC
Website,
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/cra-1991.cfm, last visited October 28, 2015.
294. See Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), Department of
Labor Website, http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/faqs/ADAfaqs.htm (last
visited Nov. 15, 2014).
295. This possibility was raised by both the Second and Fifth Circuits. See O’Connor v.
Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 1997); Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717
F.3d 431, 439 (5th Cir. 2013).
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suggested that Congress could, or perhaps should, act and protect
these individuals under these statutes.
For example, in O’Connor, the plaintiff was a student who had to
complete “field work” at one of the entities approved by her
college. 296 While there, the plaintiff was sexually harassed and sued
the state and the hospital under Titles VII and IX. 297 The district
court concluded that the plaintiff was not an “employee” and that
the entity where she volunteered was not an “educational
institution” under Title IX. 298 After next concluding that the plaintiff
was not an employee because of a lack of remuneration, the Second
Circuit ruled that the plaintiff ’s Title VII claim was without merit.299
The court was not, however, entirely enthusiastic about this result;
specifically, the court appeared to sympathize with the plaintiff and
suggested that Congress might want to act regarding this issue. 300
The Second Circuit was not the only court to be sympathetic to
volunteers who find themselves the victims of discrimination. 301 For
example, in Juino, the Fifth Circuit cited O’Connor and stated the
following after ruling that a volunteer firefighter was not an
employee under Title VII: “Lastly, we conclude that it is within the
province of Congress, and not this court, to provide a remedy under
Title VII for plaintiffs in [the plaintiff ’s] position.” 302

296. 126 F.3d at 113.
297. Id. at 114.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 116.
300. See id. at 119 (“[W]e conclude by saying only that we are not unsympathetic to
O’Connor’s situation. We recognize, for example, that from her perspective, her success at
Marymount was dependent to some degree on successfully completing her internship with
Rockland, and that her dependency on Rockland made her vulnerable to continued harassment
much as an employee dependent on a regular wage can be vulnerable to ongoing misconduct.
In a similar vein, we recognize that O’Connor was not in quite the same position to simply
walk away from the alleged harassment as are many other volunteers. However, it is for
Congress, if it should choose to do so, and not this court, to provide a remedy under either Title VII
or Title IX for plaintiffs in O’Connor’s position. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district
court.” (emphasis added)).
301. See Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 2013).
302. Id. at 439 (quoting O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 119); see also Vander Boegh v.
EnergySolutions, Inc., 772 F.3d 1056, 1061–62 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Demski v. U.S. Dep’t of
Labor, 419 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2005), where the court noted that under the Energy
Reorganization Act, Congress could expand the definition of a term it believes the courts are
interpreting too narrowly).
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Because volunteers are not covered under federal antidiscrimination statutes, and because most courts are making it
difficult for individuals to prove employee status, it is time for
Congress to listen to the Second and Fifth Circuits and step in and
correct this problem. While eliminating discrimination against
volunteers was not Congress’s objective in drafting these statutes, this
is a worthy goal that warrants changes to protect people upon whose
services many entities rely to function effectively. Also, as discussed
later, courts often broadly interpret anti-discrimination statutes and
extend their protections beyond the principal evils the statutes were
meant to address. 303
B. Courts Could Use an Expansive Interpretation of the Relevant
Statutory Definitions to Cover Volunteers, and They Could Follow
Supreme Court Precedent That Does Not Use the Threshold
Remuneration Test
Although courts have rejected a broad interpretation of the term
“individual,” 304 applying a broad interpretation to that term is one
approach courts could use to protect volunteers from discrimination.
Specifically, Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination provides
the following:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer –
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
303. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 608 (2004)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that although the ADEA was intended to protect older
workers from younger workers, the statute also protects younger workers who are within the
class protected by the ADEA); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78–
79, 82 (1998) (observing that although the impetus behind Title VII was not to prevent samesex sexual harassment, same-sex sexual harassment can be actionable under Title VII);
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 296 (1976) (holding that although
Title VII was intended to protect minorities, it also protects non-minorities).
304. See Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1242–43 (11th Cir.
1998) and cases cited therein.
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any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 305

Clearly, Title VII’s language prohibits discrimination against
“individuals.” 306 The language does not limit its protections to
“employees.” 307 One possible reason for this is that the term
“individual” covers job applicants and former employees. 308 Also,
Title VII’s language indicates that employers are prohibited from
discriminating, suggesting that only employees are the intended
beneficiaries of these statutes. 309 Although some courts have
addressed the “individuals” argument, just about all of them decided
that the term “individuals” is limited to employees, former
employees, and job applicants. 310
This approach, however, has not always been followed, 311 and
perhaps a pro-plaintiff court could return to the D.C. Circuit’s
reasoning in Sibley Mem’l Hosp. v. Wilson, which, many years ago,
gave an expansive interpretation to the word “individual.” 312 In
305. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (emphasis added). One possible way to address the
issue raised in this Article is to provide protection for volunteers who are the victims of
discrimination, but not to count volunteers when determining whether an entity has enough
employees to satisfy the statutory definition of “employer.” This is a valid option as it protects
volunteers because they are “individuals” and thus protected under the substantive
prohibitions against discrimination, yet it also respects the definition of “employer” because
that definition focuses on “employees.”
306. Id. Even with a broad interpretation of the term “individual,” this would help
volunteers only if the entities for which they “worked” employed at least fifteen employees, as
only “employers” with a minimum number of employees are subject to federal antidiscrimination statutes. See supra note 5.
307. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
308. See supra note 4.
309. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). One other problem for plaintiffs is that the
substantive prohibition against discrimination covers “compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment,” which highlights Congress’s concern regarding the employment
relationship. Id. (emphasis added).
310. See Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1242–43 (11th Cir.
1998) and numerous cases cited therein. See also Birch v. Cuyahoga Cty. Probate Court, 392
F.3d 151, 157 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that Title VII’s language prohibits discrimination
against “individuals” but deciding that the statute covers only employees); Chatmon v.
Vision Hospitality, LLC., No. 2:10-CV-485(MHT), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89242, at *10
(M.D. Ala. July 11, 2011), adopted by 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85761 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 3,
2011) (same).
311. See, e.g., Sibley Mem’l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
312. Id. at 1341–42.
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Wilson, a “private duty nurse” sued a hospital, claiming
discrimination. 313 The plaintiff appeared to work as an independent
contractor, as his name was on a registry that matched patients with
the nurses. 314 After the defendant rejected the plaintiff when he
reported for an assignment, the plaintiff sued. 315 The court addressed
whether the plaintiff was able to pursue a Title VII claim against the
hospital as the plaintiff was not truly a hospital employee.316
Although the hospital agreed that it was an “employer,” it argued
that it was not the plaintiff’s employer. 317 The hospital then argued
that the plaintiff could not sue it. 318 The court disagreed, concluding
that Title VII allowed the plaintiff to pursue his claim. 319 The court
focused on the Act’s use of the phrase “any individual.” 320
The court also noted that the EEOC charge form did not use
the term “employee,” but rather it used the term “person
aggrieved.” 321 This, according to the court, supported its position
that even “non-employees” could pursue Title VII claims. 322
The hospital then tried to use Title VII’s remedies provision as
proof that only employees could sue. 323 Specifically, the hospital
argued that the statute’s remedies would make sense only if Title VII

313. Id. at 1339–40.
314. Id. at 1339. Admittedly, this case involved the distinction between independent
contractors and employees, not the distinction between volunteers and employees.
315. Id. at 1339–40.
316. Id. at 1340–42.
317. Id. at 1340.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 1342.
320. Id. at 1341 (“The Act defines ‘employee’ as ‘an individual employed by an
employer,’ but nowhere are there words of limitation that restrict references in the Act to ‘any
individual’ as comprehending only an employee of an employer. Nor is there any good reason
to confine the meaning of ‘any individual’ to include only former employees and applicants for
employment, in addition to present employees. Those words should, therefore, be given their
ordinary meaning so long as that meaning does not conflict with the manifest policy
of the Act.”).
321. See id. The current EEOC charge form uses the terms “complainant” and
“charging
party.”
See
EEOC,
Charge
of
Discrimination,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/forms/upload/form_5.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2014).
322. Wilson, 488 F.2d at 1341. (explaining the defendant’s argument that because Title
VII’s remedies provision allows for hiring and reinstatement, it is inapplicable to volunteers,
for whom those remedies would not be applicable).
323. Id. at 1342.
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were limited to employment relationships. 324 The hospital argued
that the remedies provision “concerns relief that only an employer
can give to its employees.” 325 The court rejected this argument,
observing that the list of remedies was not an exhaustive list, but
rather it was merely “illustrative.” 326
The court therefore rejected the argument that only employees
could sue under Title VII. 327 Even prior to its analysis of the
statutory language, the court hinted that it was leaning in a proplaintiff direction. 328 Specifically, the court noted earlier in the
opinion that one of Title VII’s main purposes was “to achieve
equality of employment opportunities.” 329 It also noted that another
purpose was to “provide equal access to the job market for both men
and women.” 330 After noting that employers can exert “[c]ontrol
over access to the job market,” 331 the court stated that “it would
appear that Congress has determined to prohibit [employers] from
exerting any power [they] may have to foreclose, on indivious [sic]
grounds, access by any individual to employment opportunities
otherwise available to him.” 332 The court concluded that the
hospital’s reading of the statute would yield the anomalous result of
condoning behavior that would interfere with the individual rights
Congress sought to protect. 333
Although Wilson gave an expansive interpretation to Title VII,
most courts since then have rejected Wilson and have concluded that
“any individual” is restricted to employees, job applicants, and
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. (“While neither hiring nor reinstatement may be relevant outside the context of
direct employment, both injunctive and back pay relief (in the sense of monetary damages for
lost employment opportunities) may be available, in an appropriate case, against respondents
who are neither actual nor potential direct employers of particular complainants, but who
control access to such employment and who deny such access by reference to
invidious criteria.”).
327. Id. at 1342.
328. See id. at 1340–41.
329. Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971)) (emphasis
supplied by D.C. Circuit).
330. Id. at 1341 (quoting Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386
(5th Cir. 1971)).
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
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former employees. 334 Thus, unless Congress or the Supreme Court
instructs them to do so, lower courts will most likely not apply
Wilson to future cases.
Another way the courts could give a more broad interpretation
to these anti-discrimination statutes is by utilizing the common-law
agency test the Supreme Court used in Clackamas, Reid, and
Darden when analyzing who qualifies as an employee. 335 That test
334. See, e.g., Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1242–43 (11th Cir.
1998) and numerous cases cited therein. The court in Llampallas noted the following:
This limitation is necessary to further Congress’ intent in enacting Title VII. “Title
VII does not presume to obliterate all manner of inequity.” Instead, Congress
intended to limit the scope of the Act to specific employment relationships; thus,
the statute provides relief only against “employers” as defined under the statute. We
can assume that Congress also meant to limit the pool of potential plaintiffs under
Title VII; otherwise, any person could sue an “employer” under the statute
regardless of whether she actually had an employment relationship with that
employer. Hence, courts have almost universally held that the scope of the term
“any individual” is limited to employees.
Title VII’s remedial scheme also supports this interpretation; the statute authorizes
remedies such as reinstatement, hiring, and back pay that could not make a nonemployee plaintiff whole. Moreover, in 1972, Congress extended the reach of Title
VII to the federal workplace, amending the Act to cover “all personnel actions
affecting employees or applicants for employment . . .” Because Congress intended,
by this amendment, to make Title VII applicable in the federal workplace to the
same extent that it was already applicable in the non-federal workplace . . . the
amendment supports the interpretation of “any individual” in the original Act as
limited to those individuals who are employees.
Id. at 1243 (internal citations and emphasis omitted). Also, in Blankenship v. City of
Portsmouth, 372 F. Supp. 2d 496, 500 (E.D. Va. 2005), the district court concluded that the
term “individual” is limited to employees. Many other courts have stated that Title VII and
other remedial statutes should be given a broad construction, but those courts have still
concluded that volunteers are not “employees” under the statute. See, e.g., Scott v. City of
Minco, 393 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1189–91 (W.D. Okla. 2005).
335. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of who is an employee
under various federal statutes; however, in those cases, the issue did not involve the distinction
between employees and volunteers. See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S.
440 (2003) (applying a multi-factor, common-law agency test focusing on control when
deciding whether physician-shareholders in a medical practice group were “employees” under
the ADA); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992) (applying a
multi-factor, common-law agency test for determining who qualifies as an “employee” under
ERISA); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1989) (applying a
common-law agency test focusing on control to determine whether an individual was an
“employee” under the Copyright Act). Some of the courts that have adopted the threshold
remuneration test have argued that because there was an obvious payment in all three of these
Supreme Court cases, the Court did not have to address threshold remuneration; payment was
unquestionably present, so the Court did not have to engage in that preliminary analysis. See
supra cases cited in Part IV.
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provides a list of several factors, with no one factor (including the
issue of payment) being dispositive. 336 The test focuses mostly on the
issue of control, but it does address other issues for courts to
evaluate. 337 If the courts adopt this test, plaintiffs would be able to
get past the threshold remuneration test, a test which defeats many
plaintiffs’ claims. 338 If the courts were to look at the non-exhaustive
list of factors from the Supreme Court and the EEOC’s Compliance
Manual, more plaintiffs would be considered “employees” and more
defendants would be considered “employers.” Both of these
outcomes would allow more “volunteers” to pursue discrimination
claims. This, of course, does not change the courts’ current position
that volunteers are not entitled to pursue discrimination claims; it
does, however, allow for a broader definition of “employee” and
“employer,” which would allow more people to seek relief under
federal (and state) anti-discrimination statutes.
With just about all courts rejecting the argument that all
“individuals,” including volunteers, can sue under federal antidiscrimination statutes, 339 the more productive path plaintiffs could
pursue is to try to convince courts to adopt the Supreme Court’s test
for determining employment status. Although that test focuses more
on the distinction between employees and independent contractors
than it does on the distinction between employees and volunteers, if
courts were to apply that test to cases involving the issue of whether
someone is an employee rather than a volunteer, more “volunteers”
would be able to prove employee status and therefore be protected
from discrimination. In light of the service these individuals provide
to various entities and to the public, they should be entitled to
this protection.

336. See
EEOC,
Comp.
Man.
§
2-III(A)(1)
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html); see also supra notes 36, 37.
337. See supra note 36.
338. See supra Section IV.A.
339. See Llampallas, 163 F.3d 1236 and cases cited therein.

(2013),
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C. Although Discrimination Against Volunteers Was Not the
Principal Evil Motivating the Passage of these Statutes, the Courts
Could Still Apply the Statutes to Volunteers, and the Courts Could Also
Follow the Policy of Broadly Interpreting Anti-Discrimination Statutes
When Congress passed Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA,
discrimination against volunteers was not the principal evil it sought
to eradicate. 340 The Supreme Court has, however, on occasion noted
that anti-discrimination statutes often go beyond the principal evils
they were meant to address; specifically, in one of the most notable
examples of this, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 341 Justice
Scalia acknowledged that although same-sex sexual harassment was
not the principal evil Congress was addressing when it passed Title
VII, the law did, in fact, protect victims of same-sex sexual
harassment. 342 Justice Scalia observed:
As some courts have observed, male-on-male sexual harassment in
the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was
concerned with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory prohibitions
often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils,
and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the
principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed. 343

Justice Thomas echoed that sentiment when addressing the
ADEA; specifically, in his dissenting opinion in General Dynamics
Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, Justice Thomas concluded that although the
ADEA was intended to protect older workers, the ADEA should also
protect younger workers, as long as they were members of the
ADEA’s protected class. 344 Justice Thomas relied on Oncale’s
“principal evil” argument and stated:

340. The principal reason for passing Title VII was the elimination of racial
discrimination in employment. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273,
278–80 (1976). The evil Congress sought to eradicate when passing the ADEA was
discrimination against older individuals. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2012). The evil Congress sought
to eradicate when passing the ADA was “discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2012).
341. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
342. Id. at 79–80.
343. Id. at 79 (emphasis added).
344. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 613 (2004)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Hence, the Court apparently concludes that if Congress has in
mind a particular, principal, or primary form of discrimination
when it passes an antidiscrimination provision prohibiting persons
from “discriminating because of [some personal quality],” then the
phrase “discriminate because of [some personal quality]” only
covers the principal or most common form of discrimination
relating to this personal quality.
The
Court,
however,
has
not
typically
interpreted
nondiscrimination statutes in this odd manner. “[S]tatutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws
rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we
are governed.” 345

Applying this “principal evil” argument here, one could certainly
argue that even though discrimination against volunteers was not the
principal evil Congress sought to eradicate when passing these
statutes, volunteers should still be protected by this legislation.
Unlike Oncale and Cline, however, where a plain reading of the
relevant statutory language certainly could have been interpreted in
the way Justices Scalia and Thomas argued it should have been
interpreted, the statutory language involved with the issue of
whether volunteers are covered under federal anti-discrimination
statutes more likely than not favors a result where the individuals are
not protected, as those anti-discrimination laws focus on employment
relationships, not volunteer relationships. 346 As a result, courts will be
less likely to use the “principal evil” argument and adopt a proplaintiff approach.
In addition to the “principal evil” argument, there is another
argument courts could use to conclude that Title VII should protect
volunteers; specifically, since Title VII’s enactment, many courts have
345. Id. at 608 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79). See
also McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279, where the Court held that although Title VII was intended
to protect minorities, it also protected non-minorities.
346. See Tadros v. Coleman, 717 F. Supp. 996, 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff’d, 898 F.2d
10 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Title VII is an employment law, available only to employees . . . seeking
redress for the unlawful employment practices of their employers.”). See also Fantini v. Salem
State Coll., 557 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 2009) (“‘The employment discrimination statutes have
broad remedial purposes and should be interpreted liberally, but that cannot trump the narrow,
focused conclusion we draw from the structure and logic of the statutes.’”) (quoting EEOC v.
AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1282 (7th Cir. 1995)).

169

03.ROSENTHAL.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/1/2016 8:57 PM

2016

observed that anti-discrimination statutes should be interpreted
broadly. 347 For example, in 1971, the Supreme Court commented
that Title VII should be interpreted broadly when it handed down
its decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 348 More recently, the Court
has interpreted anti-discrimination statutes broadly and in favor of
plaintiffs in order to further those statutes’ purposes. 349 For example,
in Crawford, the Court provided a broad interpretation of Title
VII’s anti-retaliation provision’s opposition clause. 350 Also, the Court
in Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP adopted a broad interpretation
of Title VII and determined that Title VII prohibits third-party
retaliation. 351 Therefore, although the Court has in some instances
taken a restrictive view of these statutes, it has routinely mentioned
that these statutes should be interpreted broadly.
As a result of these statements from the Court, many United
States Courts of Appeals and United States District Courts have
followed that guidance and have given a broad interpretation to
these statutes. 352 As just noted, several United States Courts of
Appeals have recognized that remedial statutes such as Title VII, the
ADEA, and the ADA should be interpreted broadly. For example, in
Gerner v. Cty. of Chesterfield, the Fourth Circuit reversed a lower
court’s granting of the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
Title VII claim, which was based on sex discrimination. 353 In
reaching its conclusion that the district court incorrectly granted the
motion to dismiss, the Fourth Circuit referred to the text of Title
VII and observed that “[c]ourts have consistently interpreted this
347. As addressed in this Section of the Article, this is true in cases from the United
States Supreme Court, the United States Courts of Appeals, and the United States
District Courts.
348. 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971).
349. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271 (2009)
(providing a broad, pro-plaintiff interpretation of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision);
Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170 (2011) (adopting a pro-plaintiff position and
allowing third-party retaliation claims under Title VII); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (adopting a somewhat liberal definition of “adverse employment
action” and also deciding that employers can be held liable for retaliatory conduct that occurs
off-site). Also, the Court took a pro-plaintiff approach in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S.
337 (1997), when it decided that Title VII covered former employees.
350. See Crawford, 555 U.S. at 276–80.
351. 562 U.S. 170 (2011).
352. Some of these cases are addressed now.
353. 674 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2012).

170

03.ROSENTHAL.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

117

8/1/2016 8:57 PM

No Good Deed Goes Unpunished

intentionally broad language to apply to potential, current, and past
employees.” 354 The court noted that the statute protected “any
individual,”
and
that
this
language
clearly
protects
former employees. 355
Similar to the Fourth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit has also
recently emphasized that federal anti-discrimination statutes should
be interpreted broadly. 356 In reversing the district court’s granting of
summary judgment in favor of the defendant in a religious
discrimination claim, the court in Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners,
LLC, noted that “Title VII is a remedial statute that we construe
liberally in favor of employee protection.” 357
United States District Courts have also agreed that remedial
statutes such as Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA should be
interpreted broadly; in fact, some of these district court opinions
involved the particular topic of this Article. 358 Specifically, in EEOC v.
Pettegrove Truck Serv., Inc., the court had to decide whether two
family members who did not draw a salary were employees. 359 If they
were employees, the company would have met the fifteen-employee
threshold to be covered under Title VII. 360 In concluding that these
individuals were employees, the court noted that “a broad
interpretation of the term employee is necessary to effectuate the
purposes of Title VII.” 361 Thus, the court gave a broad interpretation
to the term “employee,” and if other courts are willing to use the
“broad
interpretation”
analysis
when
addressing
the
employee/volunteer issue, more individuals will be protected.

354. Id. at 268 (emphasis in original).
355. Id. Although the court adopted a broad interpretation of “any individual,” it was
referring to a former employee, not a volunteer. Id. Courts, including the Supreme Court,
have been much more receptive to the issue of whether federal anti-discrimination laws protect
former employees than they have been to the issue of whether those statutes protect
volunteers. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997) (deciding that former
employees are protected under Title VII).
356. See Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 450 (7th Cir. 2013).
357. Id.
358. See, e.g., EEOC v. Pettegrove Truck Serv., 716 F. Supp. 1430 (S.D. Fla. 1989);
Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad, No. 11 C 04920, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171623 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 4, 2012).
359. 716 F. Supp. at 1432–33.
360. Id. at 1432.
361. Id. at 1433.
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Other district courts have also observed that Title VII should be
interpreted broadly; specifically, the court in Volling relied on
Seventh Circuit precedent and observed that courts are required to
construe Title VII broadly and that the term “employee” should be
given a “generous construction.” 362 If more courts applied this
approach, more volunteers would be covered, and many
“workplaces” would be more inviting places for people to
volunteer their time. 363
Following such an approach would encourage volunteers who
are facing discrimination to continue providing services to the
entities for which they volunteer. This is something Congress and
the courts should want, but is only likely to happen by changing the
way of analyzing the volunteer issue.
D. The EEOC Could Change Its Position and Interpret Federal AntiDiscrimination Statutes to Protect Volunteers
The EEOC has not issued a regulation regarding whether these
statutes should apply to volunteers. 364 It has, however, addressed this
issue in section 2-III(A)(1)(c) of its Compliance Manual. There, the
EEOC is quite clear that volunteers cannot pursue these claims;
however, the agency does provide exceptions to this general rule. 365
Specifically, according to the Manual:
Volunteers usually are not protected “employees.” However, an
individual may be considered an employee of a particular entity if,
as a result of volunteer service, s/he receives benefits such as a
pension, group life insurance, workers’ compensation, and access to
professional certification, even if the benefits are provided by a
third party. The benefits constitute “significant remuneration”

362. Volling, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171623, at *32 (relying on Smith v. Castaways
Family Diner, 453 F.3d 971, 985–86 (7th Cir. 2006) and on Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc.,
87 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 1996)).
363. See Volling, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171623, at *32–33 (“A workplace is not
necessarily any different for a non-compensated volunteer than it is for a
compensated ’employee,’ and while both are generally free to quit if they don’t like the
conditions (at-will employment being the norm), neither should have to quit to avoid sexual,
racial, or other unlawful discrimination and harassment.”).
364. See supra note 21.
MAN.,
§
2-III(A)(1)(c)
(2013),
365. See
EEOC
COMPL.
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html.

172

03.ROSENTHAL.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

117

8/1/2016 8:57 PM

No Good Deed Goes Unpunished
rather than merely the “inconsequential incidents of an otherwise
gratuitous relationship.” 366

The EEOC also has the following exception listed in its Manual:
“A volunteer may also be covered by the EEO statutes if the
volunteer work is required for regular employment or regularly leads
to regular employment with the same entity. In such situations,
discrimination by the respondent operates to deny the charging party
an employment opportunity.” 367 Although many courts agree with
the EEOC’s positions on when “volunteers” can sue under federal
anti-discrimination statutes, the EEOC Compliance Manual does not
have the force of law, and the Supreme Court has determined that
the positions the agency has articulated in the Compliance Manual
are “entitled to respect” only to the extent that they have the
“power to persuade.” 368 As a result, even if the EEOC changes the
position it articulated in the Compliance Manual with respect to
whether volunteers can pursue federal anti-discrimination claims, it is
uncertain, at best, whether courts would defer to that position.
Even if the EEOC does not change its position on this issue, at
the very least, courts could follow the EEOC’s multi-factor approach
to determine employee status. 369 Although this change would not
guarantee success for all plaintiffs, it would at least give them
stronger footing on which to stand when pursuing these
discrimination claims. By changing its position with respect to
volunteers and their status under federal anti-discrimination statutes,
the EEOC can attempt to make it easier for volunteers to pursue
their claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the time and effort volunteers devote to their endeavors,
they are typically left without a federal remedy if they are
discriminated against based upon membership in a protected class.

366. Id.
367. Id.
368. See McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2001) (relying on
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) and Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944)); see also supra note 21.
369. See supra notes 37 and 67 regarding a possible inconsistency between the two
positions the EEOC has taken on this issue.
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Because the relevant statutes focus on protecting employment
relationships, volunteers must demonstrate that they are actually
employees who are mislabeled as volunteers.
Although the courts unanimously agree that volunteers are not
covered under federal anti-discrimination statutes, the courts
disagree regarding how to determine employment status. Most
courts first evaluate whether the individual in question receives
sufficient remuneration; if the individual does not receive sufficient
remuneration, the inquiry is over, and the individual will not be
protected. If there is sufficient remuneration, the courts then apply
common-law agency principles to complete the analysis. Other
courts look at remuneration simply as one factor in making
this determination.
To protect volunteers and to encourage volunteerism, Congress,
the courts, and the EEOC should act. Congress could do so rather
easily, as it has previously amended several anti-discrimination
statutes to broaden their protections. Without Congressional action,
the courts would have a difficult time protecting volunteers;
however, there are ways in which the courts could try to do so.
Courts could give broad interpretations to the relevant statutory
terms; they could adopt the Supreme Court’s multi-factor test for
determining employment status rather than continuing the current
majority approach of requiring remuneration as a threshold inquiry
before evaluating any other factors; they could utilize previous
alternative Supreme Court precedent that allow statutes to protect
against “evils” that might not have been the primary motivation
behind the passage of anti-discrimination statutes; or they could
follow the Supreme Court’s and other courts’ pronouncements that
anti-discrimination statutes should be interpreted broadly. Finally,
although it is likely the least effective way of protecting volunteers,
the EEOC could change its position on this issue. Even if the EEOC
was able to make this change, however, it is questionable whether
courts would defer to the EEOC’s new position.
Volunteers serve a valuable role for many types of entities. As this
Article demonstrates, many entities responsible for the health and
safety of individuals rely on volunteers to provide essential services,
and although these selfless individuals typically do not rely on their
volunteer activities for their livelihood, they should not be forced to
endure discrimination. To prevent this, Congress, the courts, and the
EEOC should all take active roles in expanding federal anti174
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discrimination statutes to protect those individuals who have little or
no protection against discrimination at the “workplace.” By doing
so, more individuals would continue volunteering their time, and
more “employers” would be required to treat those who provide
invaluable service to them more favorably.
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